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1.   Introduction
One important channel by which developments in housing mar-
kets affect the macro-economy is through changes in consumer be-
haviour. More favourable access to credit has raised household debt 
levels in many countries and house price appreciation has led to in-
creased household wealth. Several factors underlie the improved ac-
cess to credit, including changes in prudential and wider capital mar-
ket regulations, technological change and reductions in the cost of 
information technology, developments in the sharing of information 
on credit histories, and the deepening of markets for securitized con-
tracts and derivatives. The increased ability of households to extract 
or borrow against their home equity has altered consumer spending 
and saving behaviour in many countries. New types of mortgage con-
tracts have made housing more affordable at given home prices; but 
while lenders have often succeeded in spreading their risks through 
the financial system, the risks for many borrowers have increased. 
The aim of this paper is to discuss housing wealth and other asset 
effects in the context of lifecycle consumption theory, augmented for 
credit channel effects and taking account of credit market liberaliza-
tion. In Section 2, it is argued that there is some justification from 
simple lifecycle permanent income theory for the Bank of England’s 
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view that there is no effect on consumption from a permanent in-
crease in house prices. However, as soon as credit constraints based 
on asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders enter the 
picture, the implications for consumption alter dramatically. Where 
mortgage credit markets are poorly developed, potential first-time 
buyers have to save a significant fraction of their income for a hous-
ing deposit, while existing owners have limited access to home eq-
uity loans. When house prices rise, potential first-time buyers have 
to save yet harder, while the owners do not increase their spending 
much given limited access to the extra collateral. The overall effect 
of the rise in prices is then to reduce consumption. However, lib-
eralization and improvements in the efficiency of mortgage credit 
markets change both dimensions: The young save less and housing 
equity becomes more collateralizable. When house prices rise, there 
is then only a small negative effect on the spending of potential first-
time buyers, and a larger positive effect on that of existing owners 
as their collateral values increase. In Section 2, the consequences of 
institutional differences in credit markets for consumer behaviour 
through time and in comparisons between countries are discussed. 
Various nuances of credit market and other institutional differences 
are explored.
In practice, there is widespread disagreement about the role of 
housing wealth in explaining consumption. Much of the empirical 
literature (briefly reviewed in Section 3) is marred by omitted con-
trols for the common drivers both of house prices and consumption, 
including income, income growth expectations, interest rates, credit 
supply conditions, other assets and indicators of income uncertainty 
(such as changes in the unemployment rate). Omitted controls are 
likely to be correlated with house prices, thereby making estimated 
wealth or collateral effects liable to bias. For instance, while the easing 
of credit supply conditions is usually followed by a house price boom, 
failure to control for the direct effect of credit liberalization on con-
sumption can overestimate the effect of housing wealth or collateral 
on consumption. Further, models formulated entirely in quarterly 
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This paper explores the consequences of credit market liberalization 
through the lens of a modern version of the Friedman-Ando-Mo-
digliani “solved out” consumption function. An extended framework 
for modelling the consumption effects of housing wealth, collateral 
and credit is presented in Section 4, encompassing traditional fea-
tures of lifecycle theory such as income growth expectations, but 
building in the main elements of the household credit channel. This 
gives rise to an empirical model that allows the consequences of shifts 
in credit supply conditions for consumer spending to be tested, as 
well as checking for differences in the marginal propensity to con-
sume out of different types of assets. It takes account of the long- 
run information in data on consumption, income, assets and debt 
which is thrown away in the alternative (differenced) Euler equation 
approach. The model is also more robust than the Euler approach 
to deviations from the latter’s extreme assumptions about household 
rationality and information processing capacity.
This extended model has been applied in the UK, the US and other 
countries, including South Africa and Japan, though the results for 
the US and Japan are still preliminary.1 The results are discussed in 
Section 5. Key to this work is the development of an indicator of the 
shift in credit market supply conditions. For the UK, we have a so-
phisticated index developed in Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer 
(2006), consistent with a large credit market liberalization beginning 
in 1980. Liberalization significantly raised the consumption-to-income 
ratio and significantly altered the response of consumption to several   
drivers, most importantly to housing wealth. The evidence is that   
before 1980, there was no housing “wealth effect” on consumption, 
but that this effect now somewhat exceeds the effect on consumption 
of illiquid financial wealth. Evidence also points very strongly to a   
larger marginal propensity to consume out of liquid assets (minus debt) 
than that of all other assets. Further, in a separate model, the Bank of 
England’s estimates of housing equity withdrawal are well explained by 
this credit conditions index and its interaction with housing wealth. 
However, housing equity withdrawal has no explanatory power in our 
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For the US, we use a proxy for credit supply conditions based on 
the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Survey question on banks’ 
willingness to make consumer loans for durables purchases. To en-
sure robustness to the possible omission of long-run influences on 
consumption coming from demography, rising inequality and other 
factors, the consumption model includes a smooth stochastic trend. 
The key findings are the same as for the UK: The easing of credit 
market conditions has caused a significant rise in the consumption-
to-income ratio and a positive shift in the housing collateral effect. 
As in the UK, we find a higher marginal propensity to consume out 
of liquid assets minus debt than out of illiquid financial assets. How-
ever, our preliminary evidence points to the US housing collateral ef-
fect now being larger than in the UK and significantly exceeding the 
illiquid financial wealth effect. For the US, this supports the claims 
of the widely cited paper by Case et al. (2005) and research by Car-
roll et al. (2006) among others.
Further support for these findings and the extended consumption 
model comes from work on South Africa, with large wealth and col-
lateral effects. South Africa has long had a sophisticated financial sys-
tem and UK style mortgage markets, with credit market liberaliza-
tion in the 1980s and ‘90s. In contrast, research on consumption in 
Japan points to very different conclusions. We find no evidence that 
there was any important easing of credit conditions for consumers 
between 1980 and 2000. Using residential land prices as a proxy for 
house prices, we find a negative effect from higher prices on con-
sumption consistent with the view that the young save harder when 
prices rise, offsetting any wealth or collateral effects for existing own-
ers. Since Japanese inheritance tax favours residential housing, there 
are good reasons why older households are less likely to downsize or 
withdraw equity.
There are important implications, discussed in Section 6, for house-
hold vulnerability of the high debt levels that have been reached in 
many countries. The evidence that many households have poor in-
formation or understanding of financial matters suggests that, while 
most households have adequate net equity and cash flow cover for their 
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only somewhat less benign economic conditions. This has been exac-
erbated by some poor lending practices that have come to light as the 
subprime loans crisis has unfolded. A recent OECD review by Gir-
ouard et al. (2006) raises mild concerns about household vulnerability, 
but rather more disturbing is a study by Lunde (2007) using a remark-
able micro data set for Denmark (the world champion for high levels 
of household debt). 
Section 7 concludes by discussing some of the implications of the 
analysis and empirical findings of this paper. It draws parallels be-
tween the partial and temporary retreat from liberal credit conditions 
in the UK in the early 1990s and current prospects in the US. It 
examines implications for world growth of credit and house price de-
velopments in emerging markets. It also discusses wider government 
policies to deal with some of the issues raised by credit and housing 
market developments.
2.   Housing Wealth Effects and Credit Availability
In this section, the housing wealth effects implied by the lifecycle/
permanent income theory of consumption, in the absence of a credit 
channel, are examined and shown to be small or even negative. How-
ever, introducing credit constraints radically alters these conclusions. 
The implications of differences in credit and other institutions across 
countries and across time are explored. 
2.1  Housing Wealth Effects
Linguistic confusion abounds regarding “housing wealth effects” for 
consumption. We need to distinguish the effects of higher housing 
wealth due to fixed capital formation from those effects due to price 
rises. Given the focus in the literature on the role of house price rises, 
we examine here increases in real housing wealth resulting from a per-
manent rise in the relative price of housing. It is important to make two 
further distinctions. We need to distinguish the classical wealth effect on 
consumption implied by lifecycle/permanent income theory where the 
channel credit is disregarded, from housing collateral effects via greater 
access to credit. We must also distinguish non-housing consumption 
from composite real consumption including imputed housing services. 272  John N. Muellbauer
As we shall see, for the latter, there are good reasons to doubt any wealth 
effect stemming from a permanent relative price change. 
In lifecycle permanent income models, a permanent increase in 
the real price of housing has income, substitution and wealth effects. 
These can be analysed in the following simple model of consumer 
choice. In the model, c denotes non-housing consumption, p is the 
relative price of housing, H is the stock of housing, δ is the rate of de-
terioration of housing, r is the real interest rate, yp is permanent real 
non property income, and A is real financial wealth. The consumer 
maximises lifecycle utility defined on the flows of c and on the stocks 
H, in each period.
Assume that the consumer expects the future relative price of hous-
ing to be constant. Then the multi-period inter-temporal optimiza-
tion problem reduces to a two-good problem (by the Hicks aggrega-
tion theorem, see Deaton and Muellbauer, p.121) with the following 
budget constraint for housing and non-housing consumption: 
cp rH yr Ap H
p ++ =+ + () () δ 00   (2.1)
where r (A0+ pH0) effectively measures permanent property income. 
The standard view is that housing services are defined by (r+δ)H, and 
the real user cost is defined by p(r+δ), see Poterba (1984) or Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980, pp.107, 348). 
The effect of a permanent rise in the relative price of housing on 
non-housing consumption is given by:
∂∂ = − + − +∂ ∂= − + + cp rH r H pr Hp rH Hr o / ( ) ( ) / ( ) ( 0 1 δ δ δ e ) ) (2.2)
= wealth effect minus income and substitution effect   
Here e represents the own-price elasticity of demand for housing. 
The value of e is generally thought to be in the region of -0.5 to -0.7, 
moderately inelastic, see Meen (2001), Cameron et al. (2006). The 
overall effect of a price rise in housing could be positive or negative, 
but is more likely to be positive. For example with a real interest rate 
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-0.7, and assuming H is approximately equal to H0, the overall effect 
on non-housing consumption is 0.04-0.06 x 0.3=0.022.
However, we are more usually interested in the effect of a price-
induced housing wealth increase on a constant-price index of ag-
gregate consumption (including imputed consumption from housing 
services, h =(r+δ)H), than only on non-housing consumption. The 
effect on the index of total consumption2 from equation (2.1) is 
∂∂ ++ ∂∂ =− + cppr Hp rH rH /( )/ () δδ 0   (2.3)
But with H≈H0, the right hand side of equation (2.3) is bound 
to be negative in this simple model, since δ is positive. In countries 
where the housing services are incorrectly measured as δH, which 
omits the real interest cost, the effect would usually be positive. This 
is because one would expect the real interest rate generally to exceed 
the deterioration rate of housing. It is important to be cautious in 
these circumstances, for the finding of a positive housing wealth ef-
fect might be due to the mis-measurement in the National Accounts 
of housing services. Even in the circumstances of a mis-measurement 
of housing services, the theory suggests that the housing wealth effect 
(r-δ) is smaller3 than the financial wealth effect (r). 
The above is a stylised model assuming an infinitely lived repre-
sentative consumer. In finite life models, by contrast, one can argue 
about distributional effects, for example if the marginal propensities 
to consume out of wealth of older consumers downsizing to release 
housing equity are large compared to the income effects for younger 
consumers increasing their stake in housing.4
This analysis has also abstracted from taxes, and liquidity consid-
erations due to transactions costs and capital uncertainty. The lower 
are transactions costs, which include some taxes, and the lower are 
the charges of real estate agents and lawyers, the more liquid and so 
potentially spendable, is housing wealth. The tax system can have 
other effects: For example, if housing is tax advantaged for inheri-
tance tax (as is the case in Japan), older people will be less inclined to 
reduce their housing equity to maintain spending. This will reduce 
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Another aspect of liquidity, high home ownership rates, could also 
be a factor increasing the housing wealth effect. Over half of German 
households are renters, for example. While the household sector di-
rectly or indirectly owns much of the rental stock, for example, via 
pension funds, a rise in the value of the rental stock has a smaller 
wealth effect than a similar rise in value of the owner-occupied stock, 
in part because pension wealth tends to be less liquid. This makes it 
quite unlikely that there could be a positive wealth effect rationalized 
by lifecycle consumption theory for Germany, but less implausible 
that there could be one for the UK.
The Bank of England view that there is no housing wealth effect is 
based on the classical theoretical view of consumption that ignores 
the credit channel. If there is a large “housing wealth effect” of the 
kind so widely discussed by policy makers and popular commenta-
tors, then the traditional lifecycle permanent income theory looks 
like the wrong theoretical foundation. We must turn to the credit 
channel to understand the consumption effects of housing wealth 
increases induced by house price rises.
2.2  The Role of Credit
As Bernanke (2007) recently re-emphasised, the asymmetric 
information revolution led by Stiglitz and others is fundamental 
to understanding the credit channel. With moral hazard, the 
possibility of adverse selection and other agency costs, lenders 
typically limit unsecured lending (even with good information on 
the credit history of borrowers), and impose limits on the fraction 
of housing collateral up to which they will extend mortgages. 
However, there are large differences between countries and over 
time in the restrictiveness of these limits. There are two distinct 
ways in which credit markets matter for the effect of house prices 
on consumption (as argued in Aron and Muellbauer (2000)). 
The first concerns first-time buyers and the second those already 
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2.2.1  Relaxing Credit Constraints on First-time Buyers
The first point concerns young credit-constrained households sav-
ing for the minimum deposit required to get onto the owner-occupied 
housing ladder.5 Suppliers of mortgage credit set upper limits to loan-
to-income ratios and loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) to reduce default 
risk. Such households will consume less than income, the difference 
depending on the ratio of house prices to income and on the mini-
mum deposit as a fraction of the value of the house. A reduction in 
credit constraints in the form of a rise in the maximum loan-to-value 
ratio (i.e. a reduction in the minimum down-payment as a fraction of 
the value of the house), or in the maximum loan-to-income ratio, will 
raise the consumption of young households relative to income (see 
Japelli and Pagano (1994) and Deaton (1999), and micro evidence in 
Engelhardt (1996)). 
In terms of differences across countries, countries where loan-to-
value ratios offered to first-time buyers are low, will tend to have 
high aggregate household saving rates. Moreover, higher house prices 
relative to income lead to those aspiring to own a home to save a 
larger fraction of their income. Even renters who do not have such 
aspirations are likely to face higher rents in future when house prices 
rise and should therefore rein in their consumption. This negative 
effect of higher house prices can, in the aggregate, easily offset any 
small “wealth effect” defined by equation (2.3) above. Evidence from 
Italy is consistent with this negative effect (Kennedy and Andersen 
(1994), Boone et al. (2001) and Slacalek (2006)), while the high 
personal saving rate and the high average age of first-time buyers in 
Italy are stylised facts, linked to the failure of the mortgage market 
(Chiuri and Japelli, 2003). Though household debt as a fraction of 
income has risen sharply in Italy in recent years, it remains close 
to the bottom of the OECD league table of household debt/GDP. 
Domestic credit markets have become more competitive, but there is 
little evidence of major progress towards addressing the institutional 
impediments, such as the failures of the legal system and inefficien-
cies in title registration, that impede access to collateral by lenders.276  John N. Muellbauer
In terms of shifts in behaviour over time, in the many countries 
where LTVs and loan-to-income ratios available to first-time buyers 
have risen, we should expect the personal sector saving ratio to have 
declined and the negative effect of higher house prices on the con-
sumption of the young to have diminished, leaving more scope for a 
positive overall effect of house prices on consumption.
It is important to note that most of the potential first-time buyers 
of housing, saving for a housing deposit, are not credit-constrained 
in the sense of being unable to smooth consumption. The savings 
they are building up for a future housing deposit can be run down or 
increased in anticipation of shorter-term income fluctuations and in 
response to changes in real interest rates. This mechanism by which 
credit market liberalization affects consumption by relaxing down-
payment constraints is therefore quite different from the classic treat-
ment of the reduction of credit constraints for inter-temporal con-
sumption smoothing, see Flemming (1973), Hayashi (1985b).
2.2.2  Relaxing Access to Housing Collateral
Looking first at the cross-country differences, the relaxation of rules 
and spread of competition in many countries have made it easier to 
obtain loans backed by housing equity (see Poterba and Manchester, 
1989). A rise in house prices then makes it possible to increase debt, 
or to refinance other debt, at the lower interest rates made possible by 
collateral backing. The latter is equivalent to a reduction in the real 
interest rate faced by a household and is thus not really the removal 
of a credit constraint. However, for households who were previously 
credit constrained, new access to home equity loans does relax credit 
constraints in the manner analysed by Flemming. This increased access 
can occur because of an institutional shift in behaviour by lenders or 
because of a rise in house prices for a given regime governing access to 
home equity loans. Effectively, the liberalization of credit conditions 
in terms of access to home equity loans increases the “spendability” or 
liquidity of such previously illiquid housing wealth.
The size of the housing collateral effect depends on a number of 
factors. As noted in the introduction, one institutional feature af-
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formation on individuals’ credit histories by financial institutions, 
thus reducing the problem of asymmetric information, which im-
pedes lending. The USA, for example, is highly developed in this 
regard,  and  moreover  has  national  institutions,  such  as  Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, which reduce loan risk for individual lend-
ers. Different banking and regulatory histories have generated large   
differences between countries in the linkages between mortgage and 
capital markets, as Richard Green and Susan Wachter (2007) explained. 
For example, securitization through the capital markets is more devel-
oped in the US and Australia, while deposit banks, linked to interna-
tional money markets to different degrees, are more important else-
where. Transactions costs are another important factor governing the 
spendability of housing collateral. Another is the homeownership rate, 
and the degree to which rental property is owned by pension funds. 
Because pensions cannot usually be used for collateral and are less liq-
uid than other assets, countries with small homeownership rates are 
likely to have smaller housing collateral effects. The UK and US score 
high on all these characteristics: liberal, competitive credit markets, le-
gal systems giving mortgage lenders easy access to housing collateral in 
the event of default, homeownership rates around the two-thirds level, 
and relatively low transactions costs. As discussed below, the US system 
has some distinctive features—full tax relief for mortgages, low interest 
rate risk, and a relatively generous treatment of mortgage defaulters.
Maclennan et al. (1998, 2000) and Muellbauer (2003) argued that 
such differences, which imply important asymmetries in monetary 
transmission between the UK and the Eurozone, would create seri-
ous problems for the adoption of the Euro by the UK, as well as ten-
sions within the Eurozone. HM Treasury agreed that housing market 
differences were a key impediment to entry (HM Treasury, 2003). 
The recent study for the OECD by Hoeller and Rae (2007), and 
Roubini et al. (2007), confirm that these remain live issues between 
current members of the Eurozone and highlight a number of policy 
concerns, discussed further in the conclusions below.
It has sometimes been argued that the rise in personal wealth that 
results from an increase in house prices, is illusory, see Miles (1994). 
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eral tried to make use of their capital gains on housing by selling 
their property, they would force down house prices. While at the 
individual level, housing wealth appears spendable, the argument is 
that for the economy as a whole, it is not. However, the collateral 
function of housing wealth destroys this argument: With the interna-
tionalization of credit markets, as long as foreign lenders are willing 
to advance credit to households on the basis of domestic collateral 
values, these values will be far less constrained than was once the case 
by domestic income and domestic saving.6
In  terms  of  changes  over  time,  Fernandez-Corugedo  and  Mu-
ellbauer (2006) explain the liberalization of UK credit markets in 
the 1980s (and to a smaller extent in the later 1990s) in terms of 
institutional and legislative changes. These began with the elimina-
tion of exchange controls in 1979, which integrated the UK into 
global capital markets, themselves going through dramatic growth 
(e.g. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) and Rajan (2005)). Domesti-
cally, the policy constraints on bank lending were relaxed with the 
abandonment of the special deposits scheme, the “corset,” in 1980, 
which permitted the banks to enter domestic mortgage markets on a 
major scale for the first time. This led to a competitive response and 
a relaxation of constraints on the existing mutual mortgage lenders, 
the building societies, later formalised in the 1986 Building Soci-
ety Act. A new breed of mortgage lenders (the “centralized mort-
gage lenders”) acting through financial intermediaries and real estate 
agents began to enter the market in 1985 and by 1991 accounted for 
9 percent of outstanding mortgage debt. It became apparent in the 
subsequent downturn that default risk insurance to the major mort-
gage lenders had been under-priced and the rise in insurance premia 
led to a partial retrenchment of credit conditions in the early 1990s. 
Later, improved credit scoring methods, better systems for handling 
arrears, the reduction in costs of information technology and the rise 
of Internet banking led to a renewed expansion in credit conditions.   
The UK experience of financial liberalization must be seen in the 
wider international context. It is noteworthy that measures of glo-
balisation in financial markets, such as the ratio of gross capital flows 
between OECD economies, divided by OECD GDP, expanded rap-
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international capital movements in the 1980s and eliminated interest 
ceilings and other deposit and credit market restrictions. Allen and 
Santamero (1998) argue that the deepening of financial architecture 
illustrated by the development of markets for financial futures, op-
tions, swaps, securitised loans and synthetic securities have altered 
the roles of financial intermediaries. In particular, they have allowed 
far more sophisticated risk management, including by financial in-
termediaries directly or indirectly lending to households. Transac-
tions costs and asymmetric information declined with costs of IT 
and telephony, and data management and quality have improved. 
Calem et al. (2005) argue that lower consumer switching costs in the 
credit card market have increased the degree of competition in these 
markets. A similar case is made for other unsecured household debt 
markets in the United States (Lyons (2003)). In the United States, 
the automation of many of the steps in the lending process resulted 
in the cost of originating a mortgage declining from 2.5 percent to 
1.5 percent (Bennett et al. (2001)). Risks have been reduced by im-
proved initial credit scoring and case management, and transferred 
to other market participants via securitization and hedging through 
the derivatives markets, but spreading the incidence of risk into the 
international financial system, see Green and Wachter (2007).
 The 2005 Jackson Hole Symposium paper by Raghuram Rajan, 
his discussant Hyun Shin, and Alan Blinder among the other par-
ticipants, took a cautious view of the systemic risks posed by the 
incentive structures faced by many financial sector participants and 
their tendencies towards herding behaviour. The 2007 financial crisis 
appears to have validated these concerns. In view of the burgeoning 
incidence of bad loans in the US subprime market in 2007, risks 
were clearly under-priced in recent years. 
To summarize, credit market liberalization has improved access to 
unsecured credit and to secured credit. Two important aspects of the 
latter must be distinguished. The first has consequences for first-time 
buyers given access to higher loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios 
thereby lowering the saving rates of the young who are saving up for 
a housing deposit and reducing the negative impact of higher house 
prices on their consumption. The second has made it possible for 280  John N. Muellbauer
existing homeowners to make more use of their housing collateral 
than before, and so has raised the spendability of housing wealth. A 
“credit crunch” can contract these two aspects of access. 
The second aspect, easier access to home equity loans, was em-
phasized by Muellbauer and Murphy (1989, 1990),7 Miles (1992) 
and by the recent literature on the household credit channel, see   
Bernanke et al. (1999), Aoki et al. (2004), Iacoviello (2004, 2005), 
and Disney et al. (2006). However, much of the recent literature 
looks at the consequences of credit market liberalization through the 
lens of Euler equations. In other words, the first order conditions 
for inter-temporal optimization, so, missing the first aspect of credit 
market liberalization discussed above. 
The theory of inter-temporal consumption choice suggests that the 
relaxation of credit constraints has other consequences: Households 
should be more responsive than previously to substituting consump-
tion now for consumption in the future in response to lower real 
interest rates and higher expected income growth. Models of choice 
under uncertainty, when there are credit constraints, emphasize the 
role of buffer-stock saving, e.g. Deaton (1992),  Carroll (2001), and 
suggest that with easier access to credit, there should be diminished 
buffer-stock saving since ready access to borrowing can more easily 
take households through temporary downturns in income or tempo-
rary rises in consumption needs. 
Section 4 will examine the consequences of credit market liberal-
ization using a modern version of the Friedman-Ando-Modigliani 
“solved out” consumption function. This makes it possible to take 
a wider perspective incorporating credit channel effects, and also to 
take account of the long-run information in data on consumption, 
income, assets and debt which is thrown away in the Euler equation 
approach. 
3.   Literature review
The housing-consumption link has received renewed attention in 
recent empirical research with macro data.8 Recent evidence is re-
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span and Kennedy (2007). The latest view from the Bank of Eng-
land, in Benito et al. (2006), argues that there is no long-run effect of 
house prices on consumption. This is reflected in the Bank’s model, 
which contains only a short-term effect of house price changes on 
consumption. However, this effect is very unstable, falling to one-
third of its 1998 estimated value by 2005, causing difficulties for the 
forecasting ability of the model.9 The omission of the credit channel 
via housing is a widespread feature of the macro-models founded on 
efficient financial markets and rational expectations in which many 
central banks outside the US have invested in the last decade, as these 
banks have become increasingly aware. As Governor Stefan Ingves of 
the Swedish Riksbank remarks in his Jackson Hole talk, modelling 
efforts are under way to try “to understand how credit markets can 
be integrated with our general equilibrium approach to fluctuations 
in output and inflation.” Iacoviello (2005) and Calza et al. (2007) 
offer steps on the way.
Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005) claim, in contrast to the Bank of 
England, that for a panel of US states and a panel of 14 countries, the 
housing wealth effect is larger than the stock market wealth effect. 
However, the international part of the study omits controls for the 
effects of interest rates, the unemployment rate and income growth 
expectations. In addition, the equilibrium correction specification 
of their model excludes long-run housing asset and stock market 
wealth. Further, pooling 14 countries denies the heterogeneity be-
tween countries implied by their institutional differences discussed 
in Section 2 above. Shifts in credit conditions are also omitted from 
the OECD country data though, for example, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, the UK and the Netherlands all went through revolutions 
in credit availability. The rise in house prices is highly correlated with 
the omitted shift in credit conditions and is liable to be biased up. 
In principle, given reliable data, the concept of a panel study of US 
states is an excellent one, and should overcome many of these prob-
lems. Case et al. construct data for 51 US states for the period 1982-
1999. The US has integrated financial and credit markets so that 
time dummies should be able to pick up any national intercept shift 
due to credit market liberalization and macro shocks due to changes 282  John N. Muellbauer
in interest rates, aggregate unemployment, shifts in average income 
growth expectations and in aggregate demographic changes. Unfor-
tunately, there are doubts about data reliability. State retail sales data 
are based on sales tax data where these existed and on employment 
in the retail sector where they did not. At the national level, retail 
sales account for only around half of consumption. As the authors 
point out, retail sales at the state level also depend on sales tax rates 
relative to those in neighbouring states and on levels of tourism. The 
personal income data at the state level do not correspond to the non-
property income concept that one desires for the study of consump-
tion (see theoretical framework in Section 4).
In joint research with Anthony Murphy, we have recently re-analy-
sed these data.10 In equilibrium correction specifications with a com-
plete set of time dummies and state dummies, we find no long-run 
relationship between sales and income. Just as peculiar, the long-run 
effect of housing wealth on retail sales is negative, though the con-
temporaneous short-run effect is positive. Furthermore, even in the 
first difference specification reported in their Table 3, the results are 
fragile. In Column 3, for example, Case et al. report a panel regres-
sion of the log change in sales on the log change in personal income; 
log stock market wealth; and, log housing wealth with respective co-
efficients of 0.274 (11.1), 0.003 (0.5), 0.038 (3.9), where t-ratios are 
given in parentheses. This is evidence for their claim that the housing 
wealth effect exceeds the stock market wealth effect. However, they 
do not use general time dummies in their estimates. Instead, they use 
year dummies plus seasonals, which are the same for all years, which 
limits the degree to which the dummies can capture macro shocks. 
Re-estimating the equation with 68 time dummies (for the 68 obser-
vations from 1982Q2 to 1999Q1) gives the following coefficients: 
0.245 (10.1), 0.064 (4.4), 0.023 (2.8). In other words, the stock 
market wealth effect is apparently bigger and more significant than 
the housing wealth effect. We find an R-squared of 0.4160 while 
theirs is reported as 0.1458. Clearly, general time dummies radically 
change the conclusions, consistent with the general criticism that 
most studies in this area omit relevant controls. The finding that 
the stock market effect exceeds the housing wealth effect is robust 
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the stock market effects and the housing effects, gives coefficients of 
0.038 for the former and 0.015 for the latter. 
 A further criticism of the Case et al. study is that they use current 
wealth data. The budget constraint over which households optimise 
in standard consumption theory, see equation (2.1) and Section 4, is 
conditional on end of previous period assets and current income. This 
turns out to make a major difference to the results. For example, re-
gressing the log change of sales on its own lags and on the log changes 
in income, stock market and housing wealth with 4 lags and exclud-
ing current stock market and housing market wealth gives a sum of 
coefficients on the former of 0.009 and on the latter of -0.030. These 
results appear to match the finding of a long-run negative housing 
wealth in equilibrium correction specifications mentioned above, but 
do not seem at all plausible.
Carroll et al. (2006) have examined aggregate US consumption 
data from 1960 to 2005. They argue that theory and evidence do 
not support the existence of a long-run cointegrated relationship be-
tween consumption, income and wealth. Hence they argue for dif-
ferencing the data, but note that first differences may miss longer 
term effects because of habits, adjustment costs or other reasons for 
lags. They break assets into two: stock market wealth, and net worth 
minus stock market wealth. The latter is close to housing wealth 
plus liquid assets minus debt. Allowing for the lagged response of 
consumption, leads them to find a marginal propensity to consume 
out of net worth minus stock market wealth (i.e. including hous-
ing wealth or collateral) of around 0.09 and effects for stock market 
wealth of around half that magnitude or less, broadly consistent with 
the conclusions of Case et al. (2005) and also with Benjamin et al. 
(2004). Their model includes the short-term nominal interest rate 
and unemployment expectations. 
 Catte et al. (2004) rightly note institutional differences and find 
major heterogeneity for the parameters in different OECD econo-
mies. They estimate models which have long-run wealth effects, as 
well as interest rate and unemployment effects. However, they do 
not control for income expectations explicitly, or for the effects of fi-
nancial liberalization, and this is liable to bias up the estimated hous-284  John N. Muellbauer
ing wealth or collateral effects on consumption. This is also true of 
Kennedy and Andersen (1994), who study consumption in the form 
of saving ratios. Nevertheless, this study confirms the heterogene-
ity of wealth effects across countries, including an apparently nega-
tive housing wealth effect for Italy. As noted above, the need by the 
young to save more for a housing deposit with higher house prices, 
should dominate any wealth or collateral effects for owner-occupiers 
where mortgage markets are poorly developed.
Slacelek (2006) analyses 16 OECD countries using the difference 
formulation also used in Carroll et al. to cumulate the wealth effects 
over four quarters. Differencing makes the results more robust to 
structural breaks and evolving trends. His controls include changes in 
unemployment rates, interest rates and interest spreads. He confirms 
a negative “housing wealth” effect for Italy, but positive effects for 
countries with liberal credit markets, including the US, UK, Austra-
lia, the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
He also finds evidence for an increase in the marginal propensity to 
consume out of housing wealth after 1988, particularly for pooled 
Euro area countries where it had earlier been negative.
Boone et al. (2001) are sensitive to the potential importance of 
credit market liberalization and find some evidence for shifts in long-
run relationships, particularly for the UK, US and Canada, using 
dummies for credit market liberalization. They control for interest 
rate and unemployment dynamics. They also find a negative housing 
wealth coefficient for Italy. However, they do not attempt to control 
for income growth expectations or the effect of credit market liberal-
ization on the long-term consumption/income ratio.
For UK micro data, Campbell and Cocco (2005) and Attanasio 
et al. (2005) reach diametrically opposed conclusions. The latter use 
micro data from the Family Expenditure Survey for 1978-2001 to 
explain consumption spending in terms of age and cohort dummies, 
household demography, housing tenure, regional house price growth 
rates and the level of house prices. They find house price growth rate 
effects are largest for the young, followed in order by the middle-aged 
and the old, with similar effects for homeowners as for renters. They 
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suggest that house prices are just a proxy for omitted income expecta-
tions and have no independent role to play in explaining consump-
tion. However, consumption is likely to be strongly influenced by 
current income,11 by financial asset ownership (increasing with age 
and differing by region), by access to credit, variations in unemploy-
ment rates and by interest rates. The failure of this study to control 
for these variables implies that no definite conclusions about the ef-
fects of housing assets on consumption can be drawn. The consump-
tion of the young is likely to be more sensitive to current income. 
Further, regional house prices are correlated with current income. 
The relaxation of credit constraints in the 1980s would have had the 
largest effects on the consumption of the young while at the same 
time driving up house prices, so inducing the correlation found puz-
zling by Attanasio et al. The collateral role of housing wealth also 
suggests that young house owners, who are more likely to be credit 
constrained, could well be as sensitive as older owners to increases in 
house prices.
Campbell and Cocco study micro data from the UK Family Ex-
penditure Survey from 1988 to 2000, after credit market liberaliza-
tion had largely occurred. They explain changes in consumption per 
head for different cohorts classified by region, controlling for income 
growth, regional unemployment, interest rates as well as housing 
tenure, mortgage debt and regional house prices. They find, by con-
trast with Attanasio et al., that the largest house price effects are for 
the older homeowners and the lowest for renters. The fact that the 
national house prices affect the consumption of renters, clearly not 
a wealth effect, suggests that house prices contain a general “confi-
dence” or expectations effect. However, it is hard to interpret their 
findings in terms of medium run housing collateral or wealth effects, 
given that they analyse changes and not levels. Moreover, Cristini and 
Sevilla (2007) suggest that their findings are quite strongly affected 
by the household specific consumer price indices they employ.
A related study on panel data for US households for 1968-99 from 
the PSID, Lehnert (2004), finds the largest consumption growth 
rate in response to the growth rate of house prices for the 52-62 age 
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youngest households to be more responsive than middle-aged house-
holds, to which he gives the interpretation of a relaxation of credit 
constraints. While his study includes time dummies, and is therefore 
largely protected from the criticism of omitted controls, he does not 
check whether the estimated responses evolve over time.
Bover (2005) and Bostic et al. (2005) studied housing wealth ef-
fects, respectively on Spanish and US cross-sectional data. Bover uses 
a sophisticated instrumental variables methodology to estimate a mar-
ginal propensity to spend out of housing wealth in Spain of between 
1 and 2 percent, a result that seems both robust and plausible. Bostic 
et al. use pooled cross-sections merging CEX and SCF data. However, 
their parameter estimates grossly violate the basic presumption that 
if permanent labour income and assets both double, consumption 
should roughly double, which compromises their interpretability. 
In  summary,  the  robustness  of  some  of  the  micro  evidence  is 
questionable, while in aggregate time series data, it appears that the 
failure to control for shifts in credit conditions is often likely to be 
critical. Although the implications of financial liberalization have 
aroused interest, controversy and a large literature (such as Bayoumi 
(1993a, 1993b); Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1997); Bandiera et al. 
(2000); Honohan (1999)), there has not been an entirely satisfactory 
applied analysis of these implications in the consumption literature. 
One major difficulty has been to find an indicator of credit market 
deregulation with which to model the direct and interaction effects 
of financial liberalization.
4.    Framework for Modelling Housing Wealth,  
    Collateral and Credit
The aim of this section is to derive an equilibrium correction mod-
el (ECM) for consumption to answer questions about the impact on 
consumption of financial wealth, credit market liberalization and of 
housing wealth, and whether the latter has shifted with liberalization. 
The model also includes controls for income, interest rates and prox-
ies for income growth expectations and uncertainty. In principle, 
shifts in the effects of such controls with credit market liberalization 
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4.1    Theoretical Foundations
Since the seminal paper of Hall (1978), the permanent income 
hypothesis for an infinitely lived representative agent endowed with 
rational expectations has exerted a powerful influence on empirical 
work on consumption. Under a number of simplifying assumptions,12 
Hall derived a martingale property for the intertemporal efficiency 
condition on consumption, or the Euler equation: At t-1, the con-
sumer plans future consumption levels to be the same as the current 
level.
Combining this planned smoothing of consumption with the 
lifecycle budget constraint, gives the standard solved-out form of 
the consumption function
cr Ay ttt
p =+ −1   (4.1)
where yt
p is expected permanent non-property income, r is the real 
rate of return, and At-1 is the real asset stock at the end of the previous 
period. In more general lifecycle models with finite life times, (4.1) 
becomes a general linear expression,
cA y tt t
p =+ − γλ 1   (4.2)
where  the  coefficients  are  age-dependent  at  the  micro  level.  A 
solved out consumption function of this type is different from an 
Euler equation in several ways. First, an explicit income-generating 
mechanism is needed to estimate equation (4.2). Second, unlike 
the Euler equation, the solved-out consumption function does not 
discard long-run information in the data on consumption, income 
and assets. The literature on “equilibrium correction models” and 
cointegration, (e.g., Davidson et al., 1978; Engle and Granger, 1987; 
Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Banerjee et al., 1993) emphasizes 
the importance of extracting long-range information. The impact of 
credit market liberalization on consumption is easier to capture us-
ing long-run information. Third, the solved-out approach is directly 
relevant for policy analysis. For instance, the effects of a tax reform 
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be analysed by incorporating an income-forecasting model into the 
solved-out consumption function. 
The final difference concerns robustness. Even without the extreme 
informational and rationality assumptions made by the Euler approach, 
any consumer with some interest in sustaining consumption through 
time, will be aware of the lifecycle budget constraint. Such consumers 
will know that consumption out of assets needs to be smoothed over 
time, while future, as well as current, income is relevant for setting 
the current consumption level. Approximations to equation (4.2) with 
these rudimentary ingredients are likely to capture key features of con-
sumption behaviour.
4.2    Developing an Empirical Model
A useful log-linearization of equation (4.2) is shown in Muellbauer 
and Lattimore (1995) to be
logl og /l og cy Ay yy to tt tt
p
t =+ ++ () − aγ 1   (4.3)
One important advantage of equation (4.3) is to avoid the log-
assets formulation employed in many studies of consumption.13 This 
tends to be a poor approximation when asset levels are low, as is true 
for many households. It is also a poor approximation when assets are 
disaggregated to test hypotheses on, for example, the marginal pro-
pensity to consume out of equity wealth versus housing wealth. 
The difference between log permanent and log current income in 
(4.3) can be expressed as











1 δδ t t
tt k Ey m = + Δlog  (4.4)
where Δ log ymt+k can also be defined as a weighted moving average 
of forward-looking income growth rates, see Campbell (1997). To 
dynamise the static form of equation (4.2), for instance to introduce 
habits or adjustment costs, implies a partial adjustment form, see 
Muellbauer (1988) for a rigorous derivation.
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This is a rational expectations permanent income hypothesis (RE-
PIH) model with habits, where b measures the speed of adjustment. The   
parameter γ is directly interpretable as the long-run marginal propensity 
to consume out of assets. Extending the model to probabilistic income 
expectations, suggests the introduction of both a measure of income un-
certainty, θt , as well as allowing the discount factors in expected income 
growth, measured by EtΔ log ymt+k to incorporate a risk premium, there-
by discounting the future more heavily than by the real rate of interest, 
see Hayashi (1985a), Skinner (1988) and Zeldes (1989). If real interest 
rates are variable, standard theory suggests the real interest rate rt enters 
the model, with the usual interpretation of inter-temporal substitution 
and income effects.
  However, particularly where floating rate debt is important, rises 
in interest rates can have stronger effects on the spending of borrowers 
than of savers.14 This suggests including a term measuring the impact 
on the debt service ratio of the rise in nominal rates: Δnrt(dbt-1/yt), 
where nr is the nominal interest rate on debt and db is debt.15 Incorpo-
rating this debt service effect, along with income uncertainty, the real 
interest rate, and a stochastic error term, implies:
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In principle, the coefficients a
3 and γ should depend upon the real 
interest rate and on income uncertainty. For simplicity we will sup-
press this complication and the associated potential non-linearities.16
In practice, there are a number of reasons why income growth expec-
tations embodied in Et Δ log ymt+k are likely to reflect a limited horizon. 
With aggregate data it is difficult to forecast income beyond about three 
years. Indeed, widely used time series models have usually lost most of 
their forecasting power by then. This suggests that the log of income 
in the more distant future is best forecast in practice by near-term log-
income plus a constant. Further, with anticipated credit constraints, 
under buffer-stock saving theory (see Deaton 1991, 1992), a shorten-
ing of horizons is suggested. Precautionary behaviour with uncertain 290  John N. Muellbauer
“worst case scenarios” also generates buffer-stock saving, see Carroll 
(2001) who argues that plausible calibrations of micro-behaviour can 
give a practical income forecasting horizon of about three years—as 
Friedman (1957, 1963) himself suggested.17 
Finally, there is the question of the relevant level of disaggregation 
of the term At-1/yt . In Carroll’s 2001 model, there is a single liquid 
asset, and cash on hand, consisting of current income plus the liquid 
asset, can have a marginal propensity to consume as high as one-third 
in calibrations for aggregate data (though this will vary both in cross-
sections and time). Otsuka (2006) has developed a theoretical model 
of buffer stock saving in which there is a liquid asset and an illiquid 
asset with a higher return but subject to a fixed transactions cost. She 
shows that consumption responds more to liquid assets than to illiq-
uid assets. In our empirical model we therefore generalize equation 
(4.6) by splitting the asset-to-income ratio into three types: The ratio 
of liquid assets minus debt to non-property income (NLA/y); the 
ratio of illiquid financial assets to non-property income (IFA/y); and, 
the ratio of housing wealth to non-property income(HA/y).18       
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The time subscripts on the various parameters indicate that many 
parameters are likely to shift with credit market liberalization. In or-
der, a0 rises reflecting mainly reduced saving for a housing down-
payment—the direct effect of liberalization for first-time buyers;  a1 
and a3 should rise reflecting increased inter-temporal substitution; 
a2 could fall because of reduced concern with income uncertainty 
—however, the higher levels of debt held in a liberal credit regime 
may offset this; γ3 should rise with increased access to housing col-
lateral; and, b2 should fall because increased access to finance allows 
households to overcome temporary cash flow constraints from higher 
nominal rates. 
5.   Estimates for the UK, US and Other Countries
As we shall see, equation (4.7) captures key features of consump-
tion behaviour in the UK, the US, South Africa and Japan, with 
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interesting parallels and differences. The differences with Japan are 
particularly striking.
5.1    Estimates for the UK
The UK makes a particularly useful case study for the theme of 
this paper. Not only was there a very clear credit market liberaliza-
tion from 1980, but given a small open economy, UK interest rates 
and financial asset prices are strongly influenced by outside shocks, 
and are therefore more exogenous than corresponding variables in 
the US. Furthermore, the size of variation in asset prices has typi-
cally been substantially above that in the US. Finally, the UK has had 
a large survey of mortgage lenders since 1968, from which invalu-
able microeconomic information on mortgage market conditions 
has been available on a quarterly basis. This has permitted a more 
sophisticated extraction of information on credit conditions than is 
possible for most countries.
For the UK, we use the consumer credit conditions index, CCI, 
derived by Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006). It is wide-
ly perceived that credit supply conditions faced by UK consumers, 
particularly in the mortgage market, have been liberalised since the 
late 1970s, see discussion in Section 2.2 above. This paper examines 
quarterly microdata from the Survey of Mortgage Lenders (SML) to 
learn about changes in credit conditions from loan-to-value ratios 
(LTVs) and loan-to-income ratios (LTIs) of first-time buyers (classi-
fied by region and age). It combines data on the proportions of high 
LTV and high LTI loans with aggregate information on UK con-
sumer credit and mortgage debt to give ten quarterly series for 1975-
2001. These are modeled in a ten equation system. A comprehensive 
set of economic and demographic influences on the demand and 
supply of credit, applying relevant sign restrictions, are controlled 
for, including an uncertainty factor common to all ten equations. A 
single time-varying index of credit conditions captures the common 
variation in the ten credit indicators purged of the economic and de-
mographic controls. In the extension of the data to 2005, we assume 
no change in the index after 2001 and splice it to the index estimated 
in Muellbauer (1997) before 1976. The index increases in the 1980s, 292  John N. Muellbauer
peaking towards the end of the decade, retreating somewhat in the 
early 1990s and reaching a new peak in 2001.
5.1.1  Credit Conditions and Housing Equity Withdrawal
In Chart 1 we plot the credit conditions index against the ratio 
of housing equity withdrawal (as defined by the Bank of England) 
to non-property income. This ratio peaked at 0.10 (i.e. 10 percent 
of annual non-property income) in 2003. We also show the ratio 
of housing wealth to non-property income. Chart 1 shows clearly 
that, in the early 1980s, the dominant driver of mortgage equity 
withdrawal was the easing of credit conditions, while housing wealth 
actually fell relative to income. Later, with CCI at a high, if not en-
tirely stable level, variations in housing wealth became the dominant 
force. In the appendix, empirical evidence is presented suggesting 
that housing wealth was irrelevant to housing equity withdrawal in 
the UK before 1980—it is only with the easing of credit conditions 
that it started to matter. The econometric model also includes con-
trols for the ratios to income of mortgage debt and unsecured debt: 
Chart 1
UK Housing Equity Withdrawl/Non-Property Income,  
UK Credit Conditions Index and Housing Wealth/Income



















Fraction of annualized income
Housing Equity Withdrawal/Income 
Credit Conditions Index (CCI) 
Housing Wealth/Income 
Note: The scaling of the credit conditions index and of housing wealth/income is tuned to the units of housing 
equity withdrawl/income.Housing, Credit and Consumer Expenditure  293
the former with a negative effect, the latter with a positive effect. In 
other words, when mortgage debt is high, ceteris paribus, there is less 
scope for equity withdrawal; but when unsecured debt is high, there 
is an incentive to use cheaper mortgage debt to replace it. Other 
controls include the change in the unemployment rate and in inter-
est rates, weighted by the debt-to-income ratio, both with negative 
coefficients, as one should expect: Greater job insecurity and a higher 
debt service burden discourage further equity withdrawal. There is 
also evidence that equity withdrawal is influenced by demography, in 
that a rising proportion of older people seems to be associated with 
equity withdrawal.19 However, the rest of the conclusions are robust 
to the omission of this effect.
5.1.2  The UK Consumption Function
We draw on Aron et al. (2007) to summarize key evidence for UK 
consumption. We begin by estimating our version of the textbook 
rational expectations permanent income model given by equation 
(4.5), with quarterly data. Consumption refers to real per capita con-
sumer spending, including durables. Income is real per capita non-
property income. The asset-to-income ratio is defined as liquid assets 
minus debt plus illiquid financial assets plus housing wealth, taken as 
the end of previous quarter levels, relative to current income.
The dependent variable in the income forecasting equation, Δ log 
yperm, is defined as the difference between log permanent and log 
current income given by equation (4.4), where the quarterly dis-
count factor, δ, is 0.85 and the horizon, k, is 3 years (as originally 
suggested by Friedman (1963), see Carroll (2001) for discussion). 
With a discount factor of 0.85, truncating the geometric formula 
for permanent income after 12 quarters introduces only a slight ap-
proximation error.20 
In Table 1, Column 1 shows the text-book REPIH model with 
habits, with highly significant estimates of total wealth and income 
growth expectations effects and a speed of adjustment of 0.16 per 
quarter.21 The long-run marginal propensity to consume out of net 
worth is obtained by dividing its coefficient 0.0036 by the speed of 
adjustment 0.16, to give 0.022. Column 2 shows one relaxation of 294  John N. Muellbauer
Table 1
UK Estimates of Consumption Function (4.7) for 
1967Q1 to 2005Q4
Note that the interaction effect with housing assets/income, takes the form (housing assets/income-3.08)*CCI, 
where 3.08 is the mean value of housing wealth/income for 1980-2005.
Dependent Variable:
Δ log(c)
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
Variables Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio. Coeff. t-ratio.
log y- log ct-1 0.16 4.9 0.23 6.3 0.31 8.5 0.33 8.9
Credit conditions index, 
CCI
- - - - 0.020 3.5
Net liquid assets/income 0.0036 4.8 0.026 4.3 0.033 5.6 0.038 5.6
Illiquid financial
assets/income
ditto ditto 0.0076 5.9 0.0071 5.1 0.0061 4.7
Housing assets/income ditto ditto ditto ditto 0.0111 5.7 - -
Housing assets/income
x CCI
ditto ditto - - - - 0.0106 6.3
Expected income growth 0.21 4.9 0.18 4.4 0.22 5.5 0.10 2.4
Expected income growth
x CCI
- - - - - - 0.15 1.6
Real mortgage interest 
rate
- - - - -0.03 1.4 -0.04 1.5
Δ4unemployment rate - - - - -0.56 7.8 -0.64 8.6
Debt/income x Δ4
nominal interest rate




- - - - - - 0.0057 1.9
Diagnostics
Standard error of 
Equation
0.00759 0.00728 0.00614 0.00586
R2 0.579 0.616 0.734 0.763
D.W. 1.41 1.34 1.85 1.98
p-value for no structural 
break
0.112 0.064 0.093 0.754Housing, Credit and Consumer Expenditure  295
the textbook model, in which the ratio to income of net liquid assets, 
defined as liquid assets minus debt, is permitted to have a different 
coefficient from illiquid assets. This radically affects the size of the 
wealth effects, with the marginal propensity to consume for net liq-
uid assets 0.11 and out of illiquid assets 0.033, rather than the 0.022 
implied by Column 1. The speed of adjustment rises to 0.23 and the 
improvement in fit clearly rejects the textbook model in Column 1. 
In Column 3, we report on estimates of equation (4.7) again without 
including CCI or its interaction with any other variables. The ad-
ditional variables are the change in the unemployment rate, a proxy 
for income insecurity, the real interest rate, the weighted change in 
nominal interest rates on debt and a separate housing “wealth” effect. 
Though the real interest rate is insignificant, the other effects are all 
significant and the marginal propensity to consume out of housing 
wealth effect is apparently larger at 0.036 than out of illiquid finan-
cial assets at 0.023. Clearly, the superior fit of this model rejects the 
restrictions embodied in Columns 1 and 2.
Finally, we show a specification in Column 4 in which we allow 
the relevant parameters of equation (4.7) to shift with the UK index 
of credit conditions, CCI. The expected shifts in parameters all oc-
cur, though some are insignificant. Overall, the improvement in fit is 
significant relative to Column 3. We show a parsimonious version of 
the model. The housing wealth-to-income ratio is insignificant, while 
its interaction effect22 with CCI is strongly significant, and so we omit 
the former. The marginal propensity to spend out of housing assets at 
the maximum value of CCI (normalized at 1) is 0.032, while that of 
illiquid financial assets is around 0.019, which, in turn, is far below 
that of net liquid assets, at around 0.11. These results for the housing 
assets effect are lower than many found in the literature. We find that 
a four quarter moving average of observations on illiquid financial as-
sets fits better than the end of previous quarter value, consistent with 
findings by Lettau and Ludvigson (2004).23 Since much of illiquid 
financial assets lies in pension funds, this plausibly reflects the slow ad-
aptation of contribution and pay-out rates to changes in asset values.
The real interest rate effect is negative, but significant only at the 
10 percent level. According to point estimates, not shown, the evi-296  John N. Muellbauer
dence is that it strengthens as CCI rises. The debt-weighted nominal 
interest rate change, also negative, weakens as CCI rises. With easier 
access to credit, inter-temporal substitution should play a bigger role, 
explaining, as noted above, the enhanced role for income growth ex-
pectations, for which there is also evidence here. Income uncertainty 
is represented by the four quarter change in the unemployment rate, 
which has a negative effect on consumption. The interaction effect 
with CCI is positive, but quite insignificant, suggesting that higher 
debt levels may have offset the reduction in income uncertainty ef-
fects one might have expected from easier access to credit. The speed 
of adjustment is 0.33, meaning that 80 percent of the adjustment of 
consumption to income and the other explanatory variables is com-
plete after four quarters. Interestingly, adding the ratio (and its lags) 
of housing equity withdrawal to non-property income to the specifi-
cation in Column 4 shows these effects to be insignificant.
The parameters of this equation are remarkably stable as the charts 
of recursive estimates shown in Aron et al. (2007) reveal. The model 
can be interpreted in terms of cointegrated variables. Effectively, the 
log ratio of consumption to non-property income and the three asset- 
to-income ratios form a cointegrated relationship between four I(1) 
variables, subject to a shift in the intercept via CCI. Since the real in-
terest rate is arguably I(0), and, in any case plays only a marginal role, 
we can neglect it here. We carried out a cointegration analysis, in 
which we treat CCI as an exogenous shift dummy, and include in the 
equation system I(0) variables such as income growth and  forecast 
growth and the change in the unemployment rate and the impulse 
dummies, but outside the cointegration space. With a lag of two, 
there is only one cointegrating relationship, and this is close to the 
long-run solution implied by the Column 2 estimates. Effectively, 
this analysis treats current income growth and the forecast of future 
growth and the unemployment rate as weakly exogenous variables. 
Evidence for weak exogeneity is found from models for these I(0) 
variables, in which the lagged equilibrium correction term implied 
by the cointegration vector is insignificant.24 For the UK, therefore, 
the pessimism expressed by Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) and Car-
roll et al. (2006) for the existence of a cointegrating relationship be-
tween consumption, income and assets appears to be misplaced, at Housing, Credit and Consumer Expenditure  297
least once the CCI effect is included and assets are split into the three 
components indicated.
A further specification check on the model is to estimate it intro-
ducing a smooth stochastic trend, to capture omitted demographic 
and other trending effects, see discussion below for the US. Using 
the STAMP software (Koopman, Harvey, Doornik and Shephard, 
2000), we find no indication of such a trend, in contrast to the US. 
This suggests that the net influence of such omitted effects on con-
sumption is small for the UK in this period, relative to the large 
variations in asset prices, credit conditions, unemployment changes 
and other shocks. The indications are that higher income inequality 
may have lowered the consumption-to-income ratio while a higher 
proportion of adults aged over 65 may have raised it. But these trend-
ing effects are hard to identify. 
 Charts 2 and 3 show the long-run contribution to the log con-
sumption-to-income ratio of the three asset-to-income ratios and of 
the credit conditions index, weighting each by its estimated long-run 
coefficient. As discussed further below, it should be noted that these 
are not general equilibrium effects. Chart 2 suggests that a substan-
tial part of the upturn in consumption relative to income can be at-
tributed to the rise in the credit conditions index, and that some of 
the upturn in consumption relative to income from 1984 to 1989, 
and much of the upturn from 1995 to 2005, can be attributed to the 
rises in the collateral values of homes relative to income. 
 Chart 3 further suggests that the upward trend in the value of illiq-
uid wealth holdings relative to income also played in important part 
in the upward trend in consumption relative to income. However, 
the rise in debt, reflected in the fall of net liquid assets relative to in-
come seen in Chart 3, has major offsetting effects in the long run.25 
The fact that the estimated marginal propensity to consume out of 
net liquid assets is substantially higher than that out of other assets 
is quite important here. Much conventional discussion of wealth ef-
fects focuses on net worth and so misses the special role of liquidity 
and of debt. Chart 3 suggests that UK consumption levels are now 
quite vulnerable to downturns in asset prices, given that debt is hard 
to reduce in the short-run.26298  John N. Muellbauer
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Chart 2
Long-run Contributions to Log Consumption/Income 
of the Credit Conditions Index and its Interaction 
with Housing Wealth/Income
Chart 3
Long-Run Contributions to Log Consumption/Income of Net  
Liquid Assets/Income and Illiquid Financial Assets/Income
Note: Asset-to-income ratios are defined as end of last quarter assets/4 (current quarterly non-property income). 
Explanatory variables are scaled by the estimated coefficients in the long-run solution. See footnote to Table 1 for 
the definition of the interaction between CCI and housing wealth/income.
Note: Asset-to-income ratios are defined as end of last quarter assets/4 (current quarterly non-property income). 
Explanatory variables are scaled by the estimated coefficients in the long-run solution.Housing, Credit and Consumer Expenditure  299
With these results, the key questions I was asked to address can 
now be answered, at least for the UK. The first question was whether 
changes in the ability of households to borrow/extract home equity 
have influenced consumer spending? The answer is clearly “yes.” Our 
evidence is that there was no housing wealth effect before 1980, but 
thereafter the size of the effect increased as credit supply conditions 
eased. But it is important to realize that the relaxation of credit con-
ditions in the UK, both for first-time buyers and for existing owners, 
has influenced consumer spending in multiple ways: It has directly 
increased the consumption-to-income ratio, and, as well as introduc-
ing a housing collateral effect, it has shifted the influence of income 
growth expectations and the cash flow impact of nominal interest 
rate changes. There is also mild evidence that it has increased the 
negative effect on consumption of real interest rates.27
A second question asked whether these changes help explain the 
decline in the household saving rate that some countries have experi-
enced in recent years? The partial equilibrium answer to this question 
is very clearly “yes” for the UK. The estimated direct long-run effect 
of the change in CCI  from 1980 to 2001 on the log consumption to 
income ratio and hence on the personal sector saving ratio is approxi-
mately 6.5 percentage points, given real interest rates, and ratios to in-
come of net liquid assets, illiquid financial assets and housing wealth.
 To find the long-run general equilibrium effect, we need to take 
into account the effect of credit market liberalization on these four 
variables. It is clear that credit market liberalization was associated 
with a rise in real interest rates, though this has a relatively small 
direct effect on the consumption to income ratio. Let us suppose 
that the illiquid financial asset to income ratio is likely to have been 
little affected by consumer credit market liberalization. The effect via 
housing wealth has two parts: One is the interaction effect between 
CCI and the housing wealth-to-income ratio, and the other is the ef-
fect on house prices. We analysed the latter in Cameron et al. (2006). 
Again, we find a direct positive effect from CCI on house prices, 
raising the house price-to-income ratio by around 25 percent since 
1980, but since interest rates are higher, in part because of the credit 300  John N. Muellbauer
revolution, the net effect is perhaps only half as much, depending 
on- how much of the rise in rates is attributed to CCI. 
 Much the more important effect results from the new spendability 
of housing wealth. The composite variable defined by the interac-
tion of the housing wealth-to-income ratio with CCI rose by 1.65 
between 1980 and 2005. With a long-run coefficient of 0.032, this 
accounts for a rise in the consumption-to-income ratio of just over 5 
percentage points. However, there was a large offset in the opposite 
direction from the rise in debt, reducing the ratio of net liquid assets 
to income. Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) attribute of 
the order of 80 percent of the rise in the debt-to-income ratio to the 
direct effect of CCI, but given important interest rate effects, the net 
effect is likely to have been substantially lower. If half of the fall in 
the ratio of net liquid assets to income from around 0.9 in 1980 to 
around -0.1 in 2005 were attributed to the general equilibrium ef-
fect of CCI, this would have had an impact on the consumption-to 
-income ratio of around -6.5 percent. 
The  main  effects  on  the  consumption-to-income  ratio  of  the 
change in CCI from 1980 to 2005 are therefore the positive direct 
effect of around 6.5 percent and a 5.3 percent increase from interact-
ing CCI with housing wealth, which are partially offset by perhaps 
a negative 6.5 percent effect from the rise in debt. The approximate 
total general equilibrium effect on the UK consumption-to-income 
ratio or the saving ratio is therefore of the order of 5 percent. How-
ever, this should be regarded as a provisional estimate depending as 
it does on assumptions about the effect of CCI on interest rates, and 
the assumption that effects on ratios to income of gross liquid and 
illiquid financial assets are small. 
Given that housing equity withdrawal has no empirical role in our 
UK consumption equation—current and lagged value of its ratio to 
income are jointly and individually insignificant, which is confirmed 
in our US evidence, one can consider the marginal informational 
value of housing equity withdrawal data. Chart 1 suggests the ratio 
shown is highly correlated with CCI. Therefore, in the absence of 
information on a credit conditions index, housing equity withdraw-
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about the joint effect of credit conditions and housing wealth, as well 
as other variables likely to be relevant for explaining consumption. 
5.2    Preliminary Estimates for the US
In joint work, John Duca, Anthony Murphy and I looked for in-
formation analogous to the micro data on loan-to-value (or its equiv-
alent, downpayment to value) and on loan-to-income (LTI) used by 
Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer in the UK context. The Amer-
ican Housing Survey has such data for 1978 to 2005, though it is a 
far smaller sample than the UK survey of mortgage lenders. Mean 
LTVs and LTIs for first-time buyers under 30 buying with a private 
mortgage are shown in Chart 4. Though some of the increase in LTI 
from the late 1990s is likely to be due to higher house prices relative 
to income, the UK parallel suggests this was not true for LTV, so its 
rise since the late 1990s is likely to have been largely due to a shift 
in the mortgage credit supply to first-time buyers. It coincides with 
the great expansion of the subprime mortgage market in this period. 
However, neither LTV nor LTI rose much from 1978 to 1998 or 
even showed much reaction to the high interest rates of the early 
Chart 4
Loan-to-Value Ratio and Loan-to-Income Ratio for Private US 
Mortgages for First-Time Buyers Under 30.
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Note: The source is the American Housing Survey, excluding government backed mortgages. The loan-to-income 
ratio add-factor is 60%, for purposes of scaling. From 1984, the data include second mortgages.302  John N. Muellbauer
1980s. This is very different from the UK and suggests that, for first-
time buyers in the US before the 2000s, the easing of credit condi-
tions may have been less dramatic than for the UK.
One data advantage the US has over the UK is the quarterly Senior 
Loan Officer Survey. Since 1966, this has reported the net percent-
age of domestic bank respondents indicating more willingness to 
make consumer installment loans, and since 1990, the net percent-
age of domestic respondents tightening standards for mortgages to 
individuals. On the face of it, these surveys report changes in credit 
conditions. Thus, if we cumulate the two series and take the negative 
of the latter, we should have indicators of credit supply conditions. 
With small trend corrections,28 the results can be seen in Chart 5. 
The data suggest some cyclical sensitivity, especially for the mortgage 
market indicator, probably connected with perceptions of risk in the 
housing market, so that short-term movements probably exaggerate 
shifts in fundamental supply conditions. Nevertheless, the longer se-
ries does suggest long-term shifts in consumer loan conditions that 
match perceptions of the easing of credit conditions.
Chart 5
Senior Loan Officer Survey Data on Consumer Installment 
Loan and Mortgage Market Credit Conditions




















SLO mortgage credit indicator 
SLO installment loans credit indicator 
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Chart 6
US Housing Equity Withdrawl/Non-Property Income and  
Housing Wealth/Non-Property Income
The series rises quite strongly from around 1984, matching the 
expansion of home equity lending from the mid-1980s. It seems that 
credit constraints on the use of housing collateral by existing owners 
started to ease then at the same time as lenders were more willing to 
make instalment loans. In Chart 6, the ratio of housing equity with-
drawal to non-property income29 is plotted against the ratio of the 
end of previous quarter’s housing wealth to non-property income. 
The correlation between the two appears to be quite high since be-
fore 1980, unlike in the UK. This again suggests that the shift in 
credit supply conditions for existing owners may have been less dra-
matic in the US than in the UK. This is consistent with the fact that 
real mortgage interest rates in the US in the 1970s were never as 
persistently negative as in the UK. At any rate, this index seems an 
excellent candidate for a US CCI.
We have estimated a model for the US of a similar form to the UK 
consumption function reported in Table 1. Since fixed-rate mortgag-
es were the norm up to 1983 and dominate the mortgage stock even 
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Note: Mortgage equity withdrawal is home mortgage borrowing less the value of residential construction put-in-
place, as a percentage of non-property income, multiplied by 10. Housing wealth/income is the end of last quarter’s 
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now, we would not expect such a strong cash flow effect on the spend-
ing of borrowers from rises in short interest rates and, indeed, do not 
find one. However, the real interest rate on new auto finance, as used 
in the Federal Reserve’s FRB-US model, and its lag, do have a strong 
effect on total consumer spending. In the US, the quarterly change 
in the unemployment rate is more significant than the four quarter 
change which was used as the UK proxy for income insecurity. 
A standard criticism of time series estimates of solved out consump-
tion functions is that there are many slowly moving, correlated fac-
Table 2
US Consumption Function Estimates for 1962Q2 to 2006Q3
Dependent Variable
Δ   log(c)
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3
Variables Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio
log yt – log ct-1 0.45 9.6 0.44 9.9 0.52 11.0
Credit conditions 
proxy
- - - - 0.040 4.0
Real auto-finance rate -0.25 3.7 -0.25 3.7 -0.21 3.2
Real auo-finance ratet-1 0.12 1.7 0.12 1.8 0.13 1.9
Change in unemploy-
ment rate, Δur
-0.63 4.6 -0.63 4.6 -0.55 4.2
Et Δ log ymt+k 0.14 3.3 0.14 3.4 0.20 4.8
Net liquid assets/
income
0.042 2.1 0.044 Restrict 0.052 Restrict
Illiquid financial as-
sets/income
0.0081 3.4 0.0081 3.4 0.0073 3.2
Housing assets/
income
0.007 0.5 - -
Housing assets/
income x US CCI
0.029 1.5 0.035 2.3 0.046 3.0
Diagnostics
Standard error of 
equation
0.00471 0.00472 0.00451
R2 0.686 0.685 0.712
D.W. 1.90 1.92 1.89
Note: All columns include a stochastic trend and dummies for outliers in 1980Q2 and 2001Q4. Non-property 
income constructed using Blinder-Deaton methodology. Wealth data from Federal Reserve Z1 release household 
balance sheets. Auto finance real interest rate for new auto purchase as constructed in FRB-US model. See text for 
credit conditions proxy. Note that interaction effect with housing assets/income, takes the form (housing assets/
income-1.87)*CCI, where 1.87 is the mean value of housing assets/income for 1962-2006. In columns 2 and 3 the 
coefficient on net liquid assets/income is restricted to be 0.1 times the coefficient on log yt– log ct-1 so that the mpc 
is 0.1 in the long-run.Housing, Credit and Consumer Expenditure  305
Chart 7
The Stochastic Trend for US Consumption  
Corresponding to Table 2, Column 2
tors that could be affecting consumption. These include demographic 
trends, evolutionary changes in the inequality of income and wealth 
and changes in Social Security and pensions systems, cohort-specific 
evolutionary shifts in attitudes in time preferences and risk, as well as 
long-term shifts in credit conditions. We therefore protect ourselves 
against this criticism by including a freely estimated smooth stochas-
tic trend in the model.30 We report preliminary results in Table 2.
When we include both housing wealth/income and its interaction 
with our candidate credit conditions index,31 the t-ratio on the for-
mer is 0.5 and on the latter 1.5, see Column 1. The implied long-
run mpc for housing wealth in 2006 is estimated at 0.080, while the 
long-run mpc for illiquid financial assets is 0.018 and for net liquid 
assets 0.095, both very close to UK estimates. The latter variable 
trends down almost monotonically, making its coefficient hard to 
identify accurately. Given the UK estimate of 0.11 and the micro 
estimates by Gross and Souleles (2002)32 in the range 0.1 to 0.15, 
we fix its long-run mpc at 0.1, by constraining its coefficient to be 
0.1 times the coefficient on (log yt – log ct-1 ). Omitting the insignifi-
cant housing wealth/income term, we then find a coefficient of 0.035 
on the interaction effect of housing wealth/income with our credit 
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conditions proxy. With a t-ratio of 2.3, this is not very accurately 
estimated, so the true coefficient could be only half as large. A coef-
ficient of 0.035 implies a long-run marginal propensity to spend at 
the credit conditions peak of 1, of 0.080, given the estimated speed 
of adjustment of 0.438. 
 For illiquid financial assets the estimated long-run mpc is 0.019, 
almost exactly the same as in UK, and highly significant, and this 
enters as a four-quarter moving average, which fits somewhat better 
than last quarter’s value, in the US as well as the UK. In all specifica-
tions the interaction of the income growth expectations term with the 
US CCI is insignificant, but the growth expectations proxy is always 
significant. A range of alternative specifications, with and without 
the stochastic trend, are all consistent with the view that the marginal 
propensity to consume out of housing wealth in recent years has sub-
stantially exceeded that out of illiquid financial wealth. This supports 
the claim by Case et al. (2005) that the housing wealth effect in the 
US exceeds the stock market wealth effect, despite queries on their 
data raised above. These results are also consistent with Benjamin et 
al. (2004) and with Carroll et al. (2006). As noted above, the latter 
separate assets into two kinds, broadly illiquid financial wealth and 
the rest, largely net liquid assets plus housing wealth. Our evidence 
is consistent with the marginal propensity to consume for housing 
collateral being almost as large as that for net liquid assets, at least 
with full credit market liberalization, though on a priori grounds it 
should be less.
I exercise a similar degree of caution to that expressed in Carroll 
et al. (2006) and emphasize that these are preliminary findings. We 
have not as yet, for example, fully checked robustness to different 
specifications of the income growth expectations proxy.33 However, 
the inclusion of the smooth stochastic trend in the estimated con-
sumption equation protects against trend like mis-specifications of 
all kinds. But, this comes at a cost: Because housing wealth/income is 
itself a relatively smooth series, one cannot obtain sharp estimates of 
its effect when the stochastic trend is included. The stochastic trend 
shown in Chart 8 is clearly correlated with the credit conditions 
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mentioned above. Clearly, the US aggregate data are simply less in-
formative than the UK’s.
Interestingly enough, if we include our credit conditions proxy in 
the model, it is highly significant, as we see in Column 3, even when 
we include the stochastic trend. Then the estimate of the housing 
wealth effect sharpens up considerably and the point estimate of its 
long-run marginal propensity to consume is now 0.088, while the 
long-run mpc for illiquid financial wealth drops to 0.014. We sus-
pect that this may be because there is a cyclical element in the credit 
conditions proxy, for example, reflecting movements in the stock 
market. In this version, the freely estimated mpc for net liquid assets 
would have been less than that out of housing wealth, which is quite 
implausible since cash must be more spendable than housing collat-
eral—a good reason to restrict the estimate for net liquid assets.34 
In the UK, the marginal propensity to consume for net liquid as-
sets is relatively accurately estimated at 0.11, and the US estimate 
in Table 2, Column 1, as well as the microeconomic evidence from 
Gross and Souleles (2002), suggests a similar value holds true in the 
US. However, the marginal propensity to consume for housing col-
lateral in the UK in recent years is close to 0.032 while most values 
Chart 8
UK Household Debt Ratios to Annualised Income
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estimated for the US, as well as ours, are substantially higher. It seems 
obvious that, given transactions costs and capital uncertainty, hous-
ing equity must be less spendable than cash, so values of the marginal 
propensity to consume for housing collateral should be substantially 
below those for net liquid assets. 
One can ask whether it is plausible that the US figure could be twice 
or more that for housing in the UK. Transactions costs are broadly 
similar: The higher fees of US real estate agents being offset in the 
UK by higher transactions tax rates (Stamp Duty). However, the US 
is different for the UK in three major ways. The first is that mortgage 
interest, even on second homes, is fully tax deductible in the US, 
while the UK, after heavily capping tax deductibility for many years, 
gradually eliminated it. This creates a relative incentive in the US for 
loading as much debt as possible on home equity. The second major 
difference is that the fixed-rate mortgage system is highly effective in 
protecting US households from interest rate risk: It protects house-
holds from rising rates and gives them a low cost option to refinance 
when rates drop. The view that there was an implicit government 
guarantee underwriting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the ex-
istence of a deep financial system permitting prepayment risk to be 
hedged effectively through the government bond market and else-
where, explains the low cost of this option, see Green and Wachter 
(2007). In contrast, as Miles (2004) makes clear, the high penalty 
charges for refinancing in the UK have discouraged demand for fixed- 
rate mortgages. Thirdly, in most US states there is a “walk away” op-
tion for households with negative housing equity: They can simply 
hand in the keys to their home to the mortgage lender and be free of 
further debt service obligations. In the UK, in contrast, borrowers can 
be pursued for seven years for any debt not covered by the sale of their 
repossessed home. Together, the tax and risk advantages of US mort-
gages, make it plausible that the marginal propensity to consume for 
home equity should be significantly larger in the US than in the UK. 
In my view, a US value of 0.06 or 0.07 is perfectly plausible. 
Though the US results are provisional, we suspect that the main 
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UK, our evidence favours the hypothesis that the easing of consumer 
credit conditions has increased the spendability of housing wealth, 
particularly through much easier access to home equity loans. The 
evidence  also  points  towards  a  major  long-run  effect  from  the   
easing of credit conditions on the ratio of consumption to income 
and hence on the household saving rate.35 As I have argued, lower 
deposit requirements for first-time buyers are likely to have been an 
ingredient in this, in addition to home equity access. If one took 
the Table 2, Column 3 estimate literally, the long-run effect of the 
rise of 0.7 in the credit conditions proxy from say 1980Q1 to 2005, 
on the log ratio of consumption to non-property income is 0.054. 
However, this depends on the correct separation in the estimates of 
the credit conditions effect from the stochastic trend, which then has 
a negative slope.36 On top of the intercept effect, comes the effect via 
the interaction of credit conditions with housing wealth, but this is 
partially offset by the fall in net liquid assets relative to income owing 
to the rise in debt. This takes us only some of the way towards the 
general equilibrium estimate, but it seems unlikely that the offsetting 
effects via higher real interest rates will be as large as in the UK. The 
circumstantial evidence is that the general equilibrium effect of credit 
market liberalization on the ratio of consumption to income in the 
US is likely to be large and positive.
5.3    Estimates for other Countries
Further support for these findings and the basic form of the con-
sumption model comes from work on South Africa, with large wealth 
and collateral effects.37 South Africa has long had a sophisticated fi-
nancial system and UK style mortgage markets, with credit market 
liberalization in the 1980s and 90s. The marginal propensity to con-
sume out of housing collateral for South Africa appears to be larger 
than for the UK, more similar to US estimates. However, the mar-
ginal propensity to consume out of financial wealth is larger than in 
either the UK or the US. We suspect there may be some upward bias 
in our estimates interpreted purely as estimated marginal propensi-
ties to consume. South Africa has, of course, been through great po-
litical turmoil and periods of great uncertainty since 1970. Despite 310  John N. Muellbauer
our efforts to control for uncertainty and expected income growth, it 
is probable that our proxies are inadequate. It is likely therefore that 
asset prices in South Africa represent a mix of genuine wealth effects 
and uncertainty and growth expectations.38 However, it is clear that 
credit market developments have had substantial effects on the per-
sonal sector saving rate in South Africa.
In contrast, work in progress with Keiko Murata on consumption 
in Japan points to very different conclusions. We find no evidence 
that between 1980 and 2000 there was any important easing of credit 
conditions for consumers. Models for household debt in Japan com-
parable to those developed in Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer 
(2006) for the UK, show no symptoms of structural breaks, once 
standard income, interest rate and asset effects with plausible magni-
tudes are accounted for. This is in sharp contrast to the UK. It seems 
likely that the non-performing loan burden of the banking system in 
the 1990s, combined with barriers to entry, impeded the efficiency 
of the Japanese mortgage market. The high spreads between interest 
rates on household saving deposits and mortgages were a symptom 
of the relative failure of the intermediation function of the Japanese 
banking system, though spreads have recently narrowed a little.
 Using residential land prices as a proxy for house prices, we find 
a negative effect from higher prices on consumption consistent with 
the view that the young save harder when prices rise, offsetting any 
wealth or collateral effects for existing owners. Since Japanese in-
heritance tax favours residential housing, there are good reasons why 
older households are less likely to downsize or withdraw equity.
Our Japanese consumption function uses income growth expecta-
tions generated from a forecasting model which places significant 
weight on the ratio to GDP of government deficits in recent years. 
This helps to explain why expansionary fiscal policy was less effec-
tive than many hoped in this period. The missing household credit 
channel together with our finding that real interest rates on saving 
deposits have a positive effect on aggregate consumption in Japan, 
help explain the relative ineffectiveness of easy monetary policy in 
Japan in this period.Housing, Credit and Consumer Expenditure  311
6.   Household Vulnerability and Debt
Ratios  to  non-property  income  of  household  debt  have  risen 
strongly: More than doubling in the US from 1980 to 2005 and 
almost trebling in the UK. Charts 8 and 9 plot the ratios to non-
property income of unsecured debt (consumer credit) and mortgage 
debt, revealing the dominant nature of the latter. However, the debt 
ratios are dwarfed by the housing wealth to income ratios, which have 
risen particularly strongly in the UK. Clearly, aggregate net equity is 
hugely positive. Therefore, questions of household vulnerability have 
mainly to do with the distributions of ratios of debt service costs in 
relation to income and of debt in relation to the asset backing, and of 
how these distributions evolve in the context of higher interest rates 
or reduced access to credit, lower income or lower asset prices. 
Micro studies generally agree that most of the increase in debt 
has been for those who can afford it, see the review of evidence in   
Girouard et al. (2006). However, as Dynan et al. (2003) and Bucks et 
al. (2006) point out, since the early 1990s, most of the rise in the US 
homeownership rate was among those with limited ability to make 
a down-payment, as LTVs rose and maturities were extended, even 
to the recent introduction of “interest only” mortgages. The flood of   
Chart 9
US Household Debt Ratios to Annualised Income
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recent  documentation  on  lending  practices  in  the  US  subprime   
market suggests that these trends became even more pronounced from 
2000.39 While mortgage default rates have been low in recent years, see   
Girouard et al. (2006), p.16, they are rising strongly in the US and 
also in the UK. The number of UK households experiencing mort-
gage repossessions rose 30 percent in the first half of 2007 compared 
to the first half of 2006, though the numbers are still only one-quarter 
of the peak reached in 1991-2.
Waldron and Young (2006) report on a September 2006 survey of 
2000 British households for evidence on the incidence of financial 
difficulties among British households and updated information on 
the distribution of indebtedness. They report a small upturn in the 
proportion of households having difficulties servicing their mortgages 
but little change in the proportion in difficulty with unsecured debt. 
The UK has not had an explosion of subprime lending of the type 
seen in the US. Nevertheless, in July 2007 the Financial Services Au-
thority took enforcement action against five subprime lenders with 
lax standards, and found that in almost half of intermediaries it inves-
tigated, there was inadequate assessment of customers’ suitability.
Potential household vulnerability has to be seen in the context of 
widespread financial illiteracy (see surveys by the US National Coun-
cil on Economic Education and the Health and Retirement Study). 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a, 2007b) report that US households 
have difficulties making very simple economic calculations, for ex-
ample, of compound interest. Miles (2004), reporting on the UK 
mortgage market for the government, found that even independent 
professional financial advisers were often poorly informed on basics. 
For example, many did not appreciate the risks of increases in inter-
est rates or that the yield curve provided information on the market 
view of interest rate prospects. He recommended a concerted effort 
to improve the transparency of debt contracts and make households 
better aware of risks.
Lunde (2007) reports on a remarkable data set from Denmark 
from which it is possible to trace the distributions of debt, income 
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very interesting because it has the oldest mortgage market in the world 
and close to world record levels of mortgage debt to GDP. Further-
more, between 2001 and 2006, national house prices rose more than 
70 percent.40 In the early 1990s, Denmark experienced severe rates 
of mortgage defaults. Lunde shows that distributions of net equity 
relative to income are now about as exposed as they were on the eve 
of that housing crisis, and debt-to-income ratios are higher, though 
interest rates are lower. He also notes that most new mortgage lend-
ing in recent years has been in the form of adjustable-rate mortgages, 
though fixed-rate debt still dominates the mortgage stock. Recent 
increases in European interest rates have thus put many households 
under financial pressure, and StatBank Denmark reports prices for 
single homes and residential flats beginning to fall in 2006Q4.
One can argue that globalisation has been a very mixed blessing for 
lower income households in highly developed economies. Though 
high global growth rates have helped maintain employment, wages 
of less skilled workers have been under pressure from low-wage Asian 
competition. Greater inequality of income and wealth and financial 
globalization have contributed to the rise in house prices. The finan-
cial system has responded by offering increasingly risky loans (and of-
ten without making clear to borrowers the true medium term costs of 
such loans). The relative prices of goods particularly important in the 
budgets of lower income families, namely food and fuel, are undergo-
ing what could be the largest sustained rise in a generation. The cost 
of debt service has increased almost everywhere, and concerns about 
inflation, in which food is playing an important part, may limit central 
bank flexibility in responding to the “credit crunch” of 2007. In this 
context, one may have some concerns about household vulnerability.
There is also the question of vulnerability of the economy as a 
whole to asset price and credit shocks. As noted in Section 5, net 
worth or even net housing wealth are not the most behaviourally 
relevant concepts for aggregate consumer spending. For example, in 
the UK our estimate of the marginal propensity to consume out of 
liquid assets minus debt is 0.11, while it is 0.032 for housing wealth. 
The fact that the latter is far smaller, limits the sensitivity of spending 
to downturns in asset prices. However, the scale of the former implies 314  John N. Muellbauer
a sustained constraint on spending, as illustrated in Chart 3, and the 
US picture, not shown, is similar.
7.   Conclusions
This paper has emphasized the importance of understanding cred-
it market developments in explaining consumer spending and the 
shifting effects, with credit liberalization, of housing wealth on such 
spending. This liberalization concerns not just the availability of 
home equity loans but also the down-payment terms offered to first-
time home buyers. I have argued that where credit markets are poorly 
developed (possibly because of limited access by lenders to collateral 
in the event of default, or lack of competition) higher house prices 
are likely to reduce aggregate consumption relative to income. This 
is because the young save more for the down-payment needed to en-
ter the market and renters save more in anticipation of higher rents, 
more than offsetting any wealth or collateral effect for homeowners. 
As credit conditions ease, lowering down-payment ratios for first-
time buyers and increasing access of homeowners to home equity 
loans, the aggregate effect of increased house prices on consumption 
is likely to become more positive. 
The omission of controls for such shifts in credit conditions, as 
well as of other variables with a direct impact on consumption, but 
correlated with house prices, is liable to bias up estimates of the mar-
ginal propensity to consume out of housing collateral. Our econo-
metric work suggests that with the current state of credit availabil-
ity in the UK, the marginal propensity to consume out of housing 
wealth is a little over 3 percent, while our provisional estimates for 
the US suggest a higher value of perhaps 6 to 7 percent. Tax advan-
taged loan costs, lower interest rate risk and less severe consequences 
of mortgage default are plausible reasons for the larger US marginal 
propensity to consume. Our work also suggests a separate direct ef-
fect on the consumption to income ratio of greater credit availability. 
Developing an indicator for credit conditions is therefore important, 
with interesting current policy implications.
Chairman  Bernanke’s  opening  remarks  at  the  Symposium  em-
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influence of monetary policy on housing and the role of housing 
in the business cycle.” The implication that institutional differences 
between countries can generate major differences in the influence 
of monetary policy and in the transmission of asset price and credit 
shocks has been explored in some detail in this paper. There is a 
connection here with the criticisms of the Fed by Ed Leamer and 
John Taylor for keeping interest rates too low and too long in 2002 
and 2003. Many macroeconomists and financial market participants 
at the time, drawing parallels with post-bubble Japan, were worried 
about deflation and the risk that monetary policy might become in-
effective in a low inflation environment. This view influenced an in-
terest rate policy widely seen as protection against such a risk. The 
tendency in modern macro to use a “one theory fits all” approach led 
to a quite erroneous evaluation of the Japanese example. As discussed 
in Section 5.3 above, monetary transmission via households in Japan 
works rather differently than in the US or the UK. One of the most 
important lessons from Japan was and is that a continued ineffec-
tiveness by the banking system to carry out its intermediation and 
investment allocation functions has very serious consequences, see 
Hoshi and Kashyap (2004). But there was no risk of that in the US 
post-2001, so that the wrong lesson was learned. Indeed, the empiri-
cal evidence of this paper suggests that, at this time, US monetary 
policy via the credit and housing channel was becoming even more 
powerful than before.
The current situation in the US and much of the discussion at the 
Symposium was lucidly anticipated by Duca (2006), including an 
excellent discussion of the role of residential construction in soft-
ening economic activity emphasised by Ed Leamer (2007), and of 
parallels and differences between the UK and the US. Fernandez-
Corugedo and Muellbauer’s credit conditions index for the UK ex-
perienced a retreat from its 1990 peak in the early 1990s, mainly 
due to the repricing of mortgage insurance premia to the mortgage 
lenders. In turn, this caused the lenders to tighten their terms to 
households. With hindsight, it seems clear that mortgage risk was 
substantially under-priced in the US in recent years, especially in the 
subprime market. The US equivalent of a credit conditions index 
will retreat somewhat from its 2005-6 peak in 2007-8. This will re-316  John N. Muellbauer
duce the marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth at 
the same time as the credit tightening has a direct negative effect on 
consumer spending. If the retreat of house prices in the US runs on, 
the combination of these two effects and the recession in construc-
tion will lower the growth rate of US domestic demand. 
Martin Feldstein’s overview and concluding remarks summarized 
these effects and the wider context very well. Nevertheless, I would em-
phasize that mortgage equity withdrawals are important not so much as 
a direct causal influence on consumption, but rather as a manifestation 
of the increased ability of households to borrow against housing wealth 
and how it alters the impact of credit conditions on consumption. The 
Federal Reserve response will support economic activity through the 
usual channels discussed by Governor Mishkin, including lowering the 
bond yields from which US mortgages are priced. 
 Fortunately, as Chairman Bernanke’s speech at the Symposium 
indicated, he has a deep appreciation of the problems of asymmetric 
information, of the credit channel by which interest rate and credit 
shocks are transmitted, of the importance of institutional change and 
the lessons of history, as well as the technical command of economet-
ric modelling to use the full resources of the Fed modellers. It is also 
fortunate that the Fed, almost alone among the leading central banks, 
did not adopt for its main model, the current generation of Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium models. These add some price sticki-
ness and adjustment costs to the Real Business Cycle model founded 
on the assumptions of efficient financial markets and rational ex-
pectations, in which all agents share the same information set and 
the same view of the future. The efficiency conditions, the Euler 
equations, for inter-temporal optimization for households, usually 
summarized by a single “representative” household, when heteroge-
neity is far more plausible, are central to these models. Not only do 
the underlying rationality and informational symmetry assumptions 
look somewhat hollow in the 2007 credit and financial market crisis, 
but these models are not readily adaptable to take on board the les-
sons of this Symposium and of the events of 2007. In contrast, the 
FRB-US model is easily adaptable, for example, by shifting some 
parameters of the consumption function, to produce simulations of Housing, Credit and Consumer Expenditure  317
a variety of scenarios that take credit market shifts into account.41 
These considerations and the huge expertise embodied in the Federal 
Reserve system certainly increase my confidence in the outlook for 
the US economy.
As far as Europe is concerned, tensions in the Eurozone of the type 
discussed by Maclennan et al. (1998, 2000) will increase. Spain and 
Ireland have large construction sectors and in 2006 started respec-
tively 5.5 and 7.5 times as many housing units per head of popula-
tion as the UK; the US, by contrast, started twice the UK propor-
tion. The Spanish construction downturn, on top of the decline in 
house prices with consumption repercussions,42 an overvalued real 
exchange rate resulting from years of higher inflation, and a corpo-
rate sector in worse shape than that of the US, and no flexibility 
of interest rates and the exchange rate, will almost certainly lead to 
recession in Spain.43 The Netherlands and Denmark will also be in 
some difficulty, as will some of the accession countries where Euro 
and Swiss Franc denominated mortgages have proved so popular, 
even though exchange rates are not yet fixed. Germany, France and 
Italy, where credit liberalization has been far slower, will mainly be 
affected by the rise in the Euro relative to the US Dollar, as will the 
countries already mentioned. Though the UK, particularly London 
and the South East, as shown by Cameron et al. (2006), is more sen-
sitive to problems in the financial sector than other European coun-
tries, the construction effect will be slight, while pent-up demand by 
those priced out of the housing market in recent years will limit the 
down-side. The UK’s interest rate and exchange rate flexibility pro-
vide further protection against falling demand.
For the rest of the global outlook, much depends on the extent of 
the decoupling of Asian demand growth from the US. The analysis 
of this paper has some relevance for this, too, but no easy answers. 
A credit revolution is in process in emerging markets, including 
China and India. Credit sharing information and credit scoring sys-
tems have been or are being installed, and consumer debt markets 
are growing at enormous rates. In many countries, house prices are 
increasing rapidly. The conventional wisdom is that these develop-
ments are bound to raise consumption relative to income. However, 318  John N. Muellbauer
it is important to be aware that, at the current stage of development 
of many of these credit markets, it is likely that higher house prices 
are still reducing consumption relative to income. Thus, while the di-
rect effect of credit market developments on consumption is positive, 
there is a partially offsetting indirect effect. 
Central banks in emerging markets face a difficult task in untangling 
the separate influences of interest rates, income growth, credit devel-
opment and higher house prices on consumption. One implication of 
the more nuanced view on the effects of house prices on consumption 
put forward here is that higher interest rates in many of these countries 
may currently have less of a growth reducing effect, at least via the 
house price channel, than is widely believed. Another implication is 
that house building in these economies could currently make an even 
larger contribution to growth by restraining the rise in house prices 
than would be the case in financially mature economies. 
Governments possess a number of policy levers to influence the 
housing market with implications for the cyclical behaviour and in-
terest rate response of their economies. It is unfortunate that govern-
ments do not accept more of their shared responsibility in dealing 
with massive and sustained house price fluctuations.44 The levers they 
possess include property taxation or subsidies, tax relief on interest 
payments, the regulation of the financial system, zoning controls for 
residential land use and incentive structures for local authorities to 
release land. For example, property taxes in proportion to value, with 
frequent revaluations, help stabilize house prices, as cash flows for 
households automatically improve if house prices fall, and automati-
cally slow when house prices increase, while households factor these 
expectations into their behaviour (detailed discussion in Muellbauer, 
2005). Subsidies or tax breaks to help first-time buyers overcome the 
widespread housing affordability problem are likely to be counter-
productive, since they will be capitalized in prices. 
Unfortunately, public opinion tends not to understand such issues, 
opening the field to populist policies, often posing central banks with 
more difficult policy dilemmas. The tightness of zoning controls influ-
ences the response of house building to higher prices. In the UK, this 
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and partly explains the high level of housing wealth relative to income. 
Along with the floating rate nature of much UK household debt, this 
makes the UK particularly responsive to short-term interest rates. 
As emphasized in this paper, heterogeneity in household borrowing 
markets and their evolution imply that home price appreciation can 
have different effects on consumer spending across countries. One 
consequence is that the almost worldwide rise of home prices of the 
early decade has had asymmetric effects across countries and on in-
ternational capital flows. These considerations have important impli-
cations for the central banking community to the extent that central 
banks either coordinate, or take into account, each other’s actions. 
This paper draws on joint work with Janine Aron, John Duca, Keiko Murata and 
Anthony Murphy, and was partially supported by the ESRC (Grant RES-000-
23-0244 ‘Improving Methods for Macro-econometric Modelling’). I am grateful 
to my collaborators and to Charles Bean for comments, and to Jirka Slacalek for 
comments on a precursor paper. I am solely responsible for any errors.320  John N. Muellbauer
Appendix
UK equations for Housing Equity Withdrawal/Non-Property 
Income for 1970Q2 to 2005Q4
Dependent variable:
 Housing equity withdrawal/income
Column 1 Column 2
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
(Housing equity withdrawal/income)t-1 0.61 10.3 0.62 10.8
Credit conditions index, CCI 0.032 4.2 0.031 3.7
Δ4 log nominal interest rate x (debt/income) t-1 -0.031 4.5 -0.036 5.4
Real mortgage interest rate mat -0.11 2.1 - -
Δ4(proportion of adult pop. aged 60+/65+)t - - 3.55 3.1
(proportion of adult pop. aged 60+/65+)t-4 - - 0.80 3.0
Change in unemployment rate Δ4urt -0.23 2.5 -0.28 3.0
Change in log real house pricest 0.050 2.1 0.053 2.2
Unsecured debtt-1/income 0.66 3.1 0.51 2.7
Mortgage debtt-1/income -0.073 6.1 -0.072 6.0
(Housing wealtht-1/income) x CCI 0.014 3.8 0.016 5.0
Diagnostics
Standard error of equation 0.00836 0.00822
Adj. R2 0.907 0.910
D.W. 1.74 1.83
p-value for no structural break 0.071 0.171
p-value for no autocorrelation up to 4th order 0.184 0.199
Note: Housing equity withdrawal data from Bank of England website. Other data are as in Aron, Muellbauer and 
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Endnotes
1The UK results are from joint work with Janine Aron (Oxford) and Anthony 
Murphy (Oxford); preliminary results for the US are from work with John Duca 
(Dallas Federal Reserve) and Anthony Murphy; results for South Africa are from 
joint work with Janine Aron; and those for Japan draw on joint work with Keiko 
Murata (Cabinet Office, Japan).
2Such an index would usually take the Laspeyres form, taking base prices as 
given. Thus, the LHS of equation (2.3) measures the response of such an index to 
the relative price of housing.
3This point seems to have been overlooked in the classic work by Modigliani and 
Brumberg (1954), Friedman (1957, 1963) and Ando and Modigliani (1963).
4In the RHS of equation (2.3), significant downsizing would see H smaller than 
H0, giving a positive overall effect on consumption, while for first-time buyers, for 
example, H0 would be zero, leaving only the negative income and substitution effect.
5Owner-occupation offers advantages in many societies, for example a preferred 
tax status, lower long-run costs than renting and the elimination of agency costs 
of landlords. One of the earliest models of saving for a deposit necessary to buy 
an illiquid asset is by Jackman and Sutton (1982). In their model of no borrowing 
without collateral, the household saves to overcome a transactions cost hurdle, but 
the authors recognize, see footnote 1, that the model is easily extended to cover the 
case where the LTV is less than 1.
6Moreover, with international migration, national housing markets are far from 
closed. For example, in the cases of Ireland and the UK, immigration has been an 
important contributor to the rise in house prices of the last decade, while signifi-
cant numbers of UK retirees have capitalized on their housing wealth in choosing 
to live abroad.
7To quote from the 1990 paper with Anthony Murphy: “With the sharp rise in 
house prices, residential property became more than half of personal sector wealth. 
Financial liberalization allowed households to cash it in as consumer expenditure 
financed by borrowing.” We placed more weight on this than on the shift in in-
come expectations preferred by our distinguished discussants.
8These empirical studies include Case, Quigley and Shiller (2005), Catte et al. 
(2004), Iacoviello (2004), Barrel and Davis (2004), Dvornak and Kohler (2003), 
Byrne and Davis (2003), Ludwig and Sloek (2002) and Boone et al. (2001). Earlier 
studies include Brodin and Nymoen (1992), Kennedy and Andersen (1994) and 
Muellbauer and Murphy (1995).
9The MPC seems to have placed more weight on other information and the 
suite of other models used at the Bank so that its interest rate decisions have been 
hard to fault.322  John N. Muellbauer
10Data available from John Quigley’s website. Results available on request.
11Cristini and Sevilla (2007) show that controlling for income, despite measure-
ment errors, sharply reduces the house price effects on this data set.
12These include no credit restrictions or “worst case scenarios” (Carroll, 1997, 
2001), quadratic utility, a given market real interest rate equal to the subjective 
discount rate, additive preferences (excluding habits and interactions with leisure), 
infinitely lived or Barro-style dynastic households, and rational expectations.
13Aron et al. (2007) also show how the approximation can be improved further 
by including a second-order term.
14This is an outcome of Jackman and Sutton’s (1982) analysis of households able 
to borrow subject to a collateral constraint, see p. 117-120 of their paper. Stiglitz 
(1999) also emphasizes such effects and Bernanke (2007) suggests that differences 
between countries in the interest sensitivity of consumption might be linked to the 
size and proportion of floating-rate debt.
15In Aron et al. (2007) we compare this formulation with an alternative in which 
the change in the nominal loan interest rate is replaced by the log change.
16In principle, the aggregate consumption function should also include trend-
like effects arising from aggregation over subgroups when evolutions take place in 
distributions of age, wealth and incomes, in life-expectancy and in social security 
provision.  
17The FRB-US model, see Brayton et al. (1997) shares this approach. The bet-
ter fitting version of the model assumes that consumers discount future income at 
25 percent per annum and also that 10 percent of consumers just spend current 
income. However, alternative versions of the model are available which assume that 
households are more forward-looking.
18Charles Bean suggested to me that the collateral interpretation of housing 
wealth should imply asymmetric reactions to house price rises and declines. While 
this is plausible, buffer stock behaviour by consumers, adjusting liquid assets and 
debt as their view of future constraints evolves, will soften such asymmetries and 
we find little evidence in Aron et al. (2007) for significant asymmetries.
19See the second column in the appendix table.
20To forecast Δ log yperm, we examined a range of alternative informational as-
sumptions. At one extreme, we regressed it simply on Δ log y and its lags, which 
would be the reduced form of an AR process in Δ log y. However, we allowed for 
the possibility of longer lags by considering also Δ4 log y at lags of 4 and 8 quarters. 
The only significant lag is a negative effect at lag 8, suggesting some kind of rever-
sion in growth rates, but this is not a very stable relationship. The next simplest is 
to introduce a trend and the level of log y. This suggests strong trend reversion, with 
some persistence in the annual growth rate, and fits better. We use it to generate a Housing, Credit and Consumer Expenditure  323
“naïve” forecast. At the other extreme, we posited a long-run relationship for log 
y as a function of a linear trend (+), real interest rates (-), the logs of real oil prices 
(-), share prices (+) and real house prices (+), the rate of taxes on income (-), the 
rate of unionization (+), since greater union power should raise the share of labour 
income, and some national accounts ratios (see Aron et al. for details). Perhaps 
surprisingly, the results are not very sensitive to which of these alternative perma-
nent income measures is chosen, and we used the simple average of the naïve and 
sophisticated forecasts.
21All specifications reported in Table 1 also include an intercept, dummies for 
temporary shifts in consumption due to sales tax anticipations, a measure of the 
change in consumer credit controls for durables purchases, and a measure of work-
ing days lost in labor disputes.
22This interaction effect takes the form (housing wealth/income minus the mean 
value of this ratio from 1980 to 2005) multiplied by CCI. The post-1980 mean 
value of the housing wealth to income ratio is 3.08, compared to a 2005Q4 value 
of 4.71.
23However, over a one or two year horizon, the estimated stock market effect on 
consumption of Lettau and Ludvigson is implausibly small.
24This answers Allen Sinai’s question at the Symposium about endogeneity bias. 
For example, income is likely to be endogenous for consumption. However, on the 
UK data, current quarter growth of real income appears to be weakly exogenous 
for the log consumption to income ratio.
25As Ed Lazear and William White noted at the Symposium, if the house price 
effect on consumption is mainly a collateral effect, payback time has to come. This 
is reflected in Chart 3. 
26Note that at mid-2007 illiquid financial assets relative to income were substan-
tially above the 2005 ratio shown in Chart 3.
27In our work on UK house prices, we find a highly significant increase in the 
(negative) real interest rate effect with the easing of credit conditions, and a reduc-
tion in the effect of the nominal rate, Cameron et al. (2006). 
28The cumulative value, SCRC, of the willingness to make instalment loans is 
defined by SCRC=(SCRC + CRC) – 6; where CRC is the net percentage of lend-
ers more willing than before; the cumulative value, SMRC of the net percentage 
of lenders tightening loan conditions, is defined by SMRC=(SMRC + MRC) - 2, 
where MRC is the net percentage tightening. The adjustments by -6 and -2 are 
equivalent to trend adjustments of the cumulative series. Minus SMRC is then 
an indicator of easier mortgage credit. Each series is scaled, so that its maximum 
value is 1.324  John N. Muellbauer
29This is the simple definition given by home mortgage borrowing less the value 
of residential construction put in place. Greenspan and Kennedy (2007) have con-
structed more sophisticated measures.
30Using the STAMP software of Harvey, Koopman, Doornik and Shephard (2000).
31The interaction effect takes the form (housing wealth/income minus its mean 
value from 1962 to 2006) multiplied by the US CCI measure.
32I am grateful to José García-Montalvo for pointing this out.
33The proxy used here rests on a forecasting equation for expected income growth 
including split time trends, the future income component of the Michigan Survey 
of consumer sentiment, and changes in short-term interest rates over the preceding 
two years. The conclusions in the text are robust to the inclusion in the forecasting 
equation of real oil prices and housing starts per capita.
34It is important to note that the stochastic trend in columns 1 and 2 incorpo-
rates the combined effect of credit market liberalization and of other trending fac-
tors. The fact that the Column 3 specification in which the US CCI variable enters 
both as a level and as an interaction effect, fits only a little better does NOT mean 
that the effect of credit market liberalization on the consumption to income ratio 
in the US is small—as suggested by Sydney Ludvigson’s discussion.
35However, on our current evidence, the post-2000 surge in credit availability to 
first-time buyers appears to have had a stronger effect on consumption through the 
house price channel than directly. This may be because many subprime borrowers 
have relatively modest levels of consumption.
36It also depends on the precise definition of the interaction effect between hous-
ing wealth/income and the US CCI. As noted above, we interact the US CCI with 
the deviation of the housing wealth/income ratio from its 1962-2006 mean. Had 
we subtracted the mean over some other period, the direct US CCI effect on the 
ratio of consumption to income would have been different.
37See Aron and Muellbauer (2007). These results use data on household wealth 
in South Africa constructed in Aron and Muellbauer (2006) and now taken over 
by the South African Reserve Bank. 
38Poterba (2000), among others, has argued that this is a generic problem even in 
the US. In our view, our proxy for US income growth expectations and the change 
in the unemployment rate do much to counter this problem. South African unem-
ployment data are unfortunately not reliable enough to be useful.
39The Wall Street Journal reported on August 16th that in 2000 Standard and 
Poor’s decided that “a type of mortgage that involves a ‘piggy-back’, where bor-
rowers simultaneously take out a second loan for the down-payment, was no more 
likely to default than a standard mortgage….six years later…it said that they were 
actually far more likely to default.”Housing, Credit and Consumer Expenditure  325
40The rise occurred in part because in 2001 the government abandoned a key 
stabilising element of the Danish property tax, the automatic annual indexation to 
property values, see Muellbauer (2005). 
41For example, taking into account some of the findings of this paper.
42Olympia Bover’s very plausible estimate of the Spanish mpc for housing wealth 
of 1.5 to 2 percent is about half the UK’s, but Spanish house prices have further 
to fall.
43While there has been occasional discussion by financial market participants of 
Italy departing from the Eurozone, it seems likely that Spain will be mentioned 
more often in this context in the coming two years.
44For example, a succession of Dutch governments and the financial regulator seem 
not to have appreciated fully the lessons for financial stability of the UK and Scandi-
navian credit and housing booms of the 1980s, and their subsequent collapse.326  John N. Muellbauer
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